
















Thesis Advisor: David S. Yost
Approved tor public release; distribution unlimited
7205421

SECURITY Cl AltiriCATlQN OF TwiS RAGE rWhatt Dim gmaf«)
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
ftCPOMT NUMlII
I. GOVT ACCESSION NO
4 TiTlE aid iukiltrt)
Soviet Foreign Policy Towards Greece and
Turkey: Contrast Within Coherence
7. AuTmOm.t)
Albert Clinton Mvers
• PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME ANO AOOWCtS
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
1 I CONTROLLING 0»'ICE NAME ANO AOORESS
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
n KONi'0»'NG ACIxCY NAME » AOORESS*// BHfMlli SS C antral I t*g Ollleat
READ INSTRUCTIONS
BEFORE COMPLET:Ne, FORM
J RECIPIENT'S CAT •LOG NUMBFn
5. TYPE Of REPORT » PERIOD COVERED
Master's Thesis
June, 1982
• performing owe. report number
• CONTRACT 51 GRANT NLMBERf«>
10. M06»*m Element project tiskARC A a WORK UNIT NUMBERS
12. REPORT DATE
June, 1982
U. NUMBER OF PACES
131
'». secuRiTY class. (at mi» , t»,r
Unclassified
l»«. OECL ASSlFI CATION- 0O*NGRA0lNGSCHEDULE
l«. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT '•/ mil Xa+art)
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
'7 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (at h, aaarracl «n«*r«4 /n Aloe* ;0. 1/ dlttarant tram Haport)
'• SU»»L EMENTARY NOTES
* I " ic«;i -'mii"u« an • •»•!••« n« 1/ n*e»«««rr •** ftfamlfy tr »/oe« nuaaprj
Soviet foreign policy towards Greece and Turkey; Soviet attempt to
impair Greek/Turkish ties to NATO and U.S.; Key political,
economic, propagandistic events in Soviet-Greek and Soviet-Turkish
post-war relations.
20. ABSTRACT 'CmOihm an faw«ra« «/aa II nacaaaar? and /tfanllfy »y kiaca naMrj
This thesis analyzes the evolution of post-1945 Soviet foreign
policy towards Greece and Turkey. The Soviet Union has sought to
impair and eliminate Greek and Turkish security ties to NATO and
to the United States. Key political, diplomatic, economic, and
propagandistic events in Soviet-Greek and Soviet-Turkish
relations suggest patterns of Soviet objectives and successes in
each country.
DO i jan 71 1473 COITION O" • MOV •• I* OMOLETE
S/N 0102-014- ««0 1
kQf rWham Dmim InfraO

The Soviet Union has pursued unobtrusive approaches towards
Greece, while making more concerted efforts through diplomatic,
economic, and perhaps clandestine means to increase Soviet
influence in Turkey. In 1978-1979, Turkey's foreign policy
seemed to be moderately influenced by Soviet preferences, while
a new situation has existed since 1980. The anti-American
orientation of Andreas Papandreou's government may offer
unprecedented opportunities to Soviet diplomacy in Greece.
U.S. blunders made on an ad hoc short-term basis, with respect
to the national sensitivities of both countries have facilitated
the successes of Soviet foreign policy. The Greek and Turkish
cases suggest that the Soviets have profited from U.S. errors in
their implementation of a long-term and consistent policy to
reduce U.S. influence in Western Europe.
DD Forqj 1473

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited




Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
B.S., Yale University 1970
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of







This thesis analyzes the evolution of post-1945 Soviet
foreign policy towards Greece and Turkey. The Soviet Union
has sought to impair and eliminate Greek and Turkish security
ties to NATO and to the United States. Key political, dip-
lomatic, economic, and propagandistic events in Soviet-Greek
and Soviet-Turkish relations suggest patterns of Soviet
objectives and successes in each country.
The Soviet Union has pursued unobtrusive approaches
towards Greece, while making more concerted efforts through
diplomatic, economic, and perhaps clandestine means to
increase Soviet influence in Turkey. In 1978-1979, Turkey's
foreign policy seemed to be moderately influenced by Soviet
preferences, while a new situation has existed since 1980.
The anti-American orientation of Andreas Papandreou's govern-
ment may offer unprecedented opportunities to Soviet diplo-
macy in Greece. U.S. blunders made on an ad hoc short-term
basis, with respect to the national sensitivities of both
countries have facilitated the successes of Soviet foreign
policy. The Greek and Turkish cases suggest that the Soviets
have profited from U.S. errors in their implementation of a
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I. INTRODUCTION
For too many Western observers, Greece and Turkey are
two secondary, obscure and distant members of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) . When they are
mentioned in the context of West European political trends,
it is almost invariably in light of the complex issues which
have so often given rise to acute tension between Athens and
Ankara. With the exception of a handful of West European
and American analysts, little attention has focused until
recently on the geopolitical importance of Greece and Turkey
to N'ATO and the West.
Explanations of this state of affairs are obvious.
First, both Greece and Turkey have been and remain far less
developed industrially than almost all of their Western
allies with the possible exception of Portugal. That
perception of poverty, highlighted by the quest of thousands
of Greeks and Turks for work in wealthier countries of
Western Europe, lends an aura of "differentness" to these
two Balkan states. Second, Greece and Turkey have many
cultural predispositions and affinities for the Eastern
Mediterranean and the Middle East which are quite distinct
from the predominant West European milieu. Though many
Greeks would not associate themselves with this observation,
it is fair to note that in a great number of respects their

country has more in common with Turkey than with most of
the Central and Northern countries of Western Europe.
Third, Greece and Turkey are physically separated from the
rest of Western Europe by a tier of socialist states,
including Bulgaria, Albania, and Yugoslavia. Somewhat
paradoxically, the essential remoteness of Greece and Turkey
from the European central regions, while contributing to
their isolation from the European mainstream, has enhanced
the relevance of their continued membership in the Western
alliance. The importance of Greece and Turkey to NATO in
large measure rests upon the almost transparently obvious
strategic considerations which flow from their pivotal
geographic locations, from a distinctive set of Greek and
Turkish national characteristics (including the documented
prowess of their soldiers in battle) , and from the existence
of several vital NATO and allied bases in both countries.
The unsettling events in Southwest Asia during the past
three years have awakened an uneasy sense in NATO circles
of the palpable vulnerability of their two Eastern-most
allies to Soviet military duress. Yet the implications of
Soviet foreign policy towards Greece and Turkey may in the
long run prove more damaging to the interests of the
Alliance. For that policy is an unremitting and persistent
process. In contrast, the imposing military strength of
the USSR, though it must continue to exact wary consideration,
may never be operationally employed against the West.

It is, then, the hypothesis of this thesis that if
Soviet foreign policy towards both these Balkan states
should succeed, these states will no longer be effectively
linked to NATO and to the United States. Soviet post-1945
diplomatic, political, propagandistic , and economic
overtures to Greece and Turkey will be analyzed in an effort
to sift through the most likely indicators of a Soviet
program to permanently enfeeble Athens' and Ankara's ties to
the West.
Such an objective would seem fitting from Moscow's
perspective. It would enhance the Soviets' curious sense of
"security," which is firmly regulated by the proposition
that Soviet security is attained at the expense of everyone's
else, and particularly at the expense of those nations near
its frontiers or its surrogates. Further, if and when
detached from the NATO sphere, it would not be unreasonable
to expect Greece and Turkey to gradually become increasingly
responsive to Soviet preferences for the shape of their
foreign and domestic policies, and more accomodating to
Soviet interests in trade exchanges and military cooperation.
Such an arrangement could essentiallv conform to Moscow's
relations with its Warsaw Pact allies, without the often
vexing responsibilities occasioned by those more formal
links
.
Recent expressions of Soviet satisfaction with trends in
European relations suggest hopes for a new European
"arrangement" to be shaped, if not regulated, by Moscow:

It is thanks to the Soviet Union and its Leninist
foreign policy that a whole range of vital issues,
including European relations, have found an equitable
solution. It was the Soviet Union and the other
socialist countries that initiated the policy of
detente, which considerably improved the political
climate in the world.. Their practical actions have
provided added proof to the whole world that
socialism and peace are inseparable and that the
socialist states are a bulwark of peace and
international security . . .
The results of those efforts are vast and tangible.
The conclusion of a series of treaties between the
socialist and capitalist states and the development
of mutually beneficial cooperation among them, as
well as the convocation of the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe and its successful conclusion
have extended international detente. [Ref. 1: pp. 6]
The kind of "arrangement" Moscow evidently has in mind
for Europe is also being somewhat elliptically conveyed in
Soviet scholarly and analytical literature:
The new style of international relations that have
taken shape and are developing among the socialist
countries provide a convincing model of relations
among nations and represent a major factor in
influencing the development of the present-day
world. [Ref. 2: pp.7]
Whether the foregoing objectives can be judged to have
shaped Soviet foreign policy towards Greece and Turkey
remains to be demonstrated conclusively. This study
includes two individual, but somewhat interrelated case
studies: Chapter two studies Soviet foreign policy towards
Greece since World War II, and chapter three analyzes Soviet
Turkish relations during the same period. Chapter four
compares and contrasts Soviet foreign policy towards Greece







SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS GREECE
The nature of Soviet foreign policy towards Greece ought
first to be evaluated in terms of Soviet regional and global
objectives, rather than in narrow bilateral terms. Greece
is virtually unique as a Balkan power, as an Eastern
Mediterranean littoral state, and as a member of NATO. Only
Turkey shares those characteristics owing to her small
outcropping into Europe on the Western shores of the Turkish
straits, which accords her nominal Balkan status. Soviet
strategies in the Balkans and in the Mediterranean have taken
Greece into account with respect to her position in the
hierarchy of Soviet objectives in each of those two areas.
Such strategies have not been rigid, nor has their overt
component - Soviet foreign policy - been unvarying towards
Greece. Changes in Greece's relations with other countries -
notably the United States and Turkey - and changes in the
Greek domestic political milieu have influenced and
mediated Soviet policies towards Greece.
The purpose of this chapter will be to review in turn
the following themes considered central to an understanding
of Soviet foreign policy towards Greece:
1. Greece' s Role in Soviet Strategy in the Balkans;
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2. The Place of Greece in Soviet Strategy in the
Mediterranean;
5. The Development of Post-World War II Soviet
Policies Towards Greece.
A. GREECE'S ROLE IN SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE BALKANS
The Balkans are conventionally defined as encompassing
Romania, Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece, Bulgaria, and Turkey
(to a lesser degree)
.
Of the four socialist countries in
the foregoing list, only one - Bulgaria - has been a
steadfast and loyal ally of the Soviet Union. Romania,
Yugoslavia and Albania have each posed challenges of various
degrees to Moscow's self -proclaimed position as the leader
of the socialist camp. Greece and Turkey, on the other hand,
have been members of NATO since 1952, when they joined the
alliance owing to strong feelings of insecurity occasioned
by Joseph Stalin's maladroit post-World War II probing in
the Eastern Mediterranean. In short, the Balkans has not
been an area noted for Soviet successes. As John Campbell
has noted:
. . . While awe of Soviet military power remained
undeniably strong, Soviet political influence in the
area had reached an extraordinarily low point by the
end of the 1960 's . . . The consolidation of Soviet
power in Central Europe, where the USSR had sizable
military forces stationed in East Germany, Poland,
Hungary, and Czechoslovakia (after 1968), contrasted
with the situation in the Balkans, where there were no
Soviet forces at all. [Ref. 3: pp. 2]
The Soviet Union's reluctance to forcefully impose its
will on the three errant socialist countries of the Balkans -
12

Romania, Yugoslavia, and Albania - probably is reflective
of complex calculations of strategic costs and benefits.
It should not be considered as demonstrating Soviet
indifference and resignation in the face of socialist
deviance. One must assume that the Soviets prefer
deference over antagonism, and thus that it is a long-term
Soviet goal to encourage the accession to leadership roles
in those countries of individuals more willing to conform
to Soviet policies and positions. Similar hopes, tempered
by an awareness of the attendant political difficulties,
likely help shape Soviet objectives vis-a-vis non-socialist
Greece and Turkey.
Greece and Turkey are the only Balkan states possessing
any U.S. installations and military personnel. Greece
shares borders with three socialist countries along her
entire mountainous Northern frontier, and with her nominal
NATO ally, Turkey, to the east. A relatively small country
in both population and size, Greece's military vulnerability
in the north - particularly along the frontier with Bulgaria •
is presumably easily discernible by both NATO and Warsaw
Pact contingency planners. The marked deterioration in Greek'
Turkish relations which occurred in the 1970 ' s because of the
Cyprus conflict (and subsequent stalemate) and the disputes
For a similar assessment see John C. Campbell; "Soviet
Strategy in the Balkans," Problems of Communism , XXIII,




in the Aegean, has likely caused some redeployment of Greek
air and ground forces from the Northern part of the country
to the Eastern part. One can assume that such a redeployment
of Greek forces (if verifiable) would be so clearly in Soviet
interests, that it would result in Soviet efforts to
exploit and exacerbate the Greek-Turkish disputes. There is
some evidence of Soviet exploitation of the disputes in terms
of Soviet efforts to improve bilateral relations with those
two countries during periods of significant anti-American
sentiment, and/or heightened Greek-Turkish antagonism.
Soviet attempts to exacerbate the disputes, though they
cannot be ruled out, have not been demonstrated.
As a NATO outpost in the predominantly socialist
Balkans, Greece no doubt figures in Soviet calculations
regarding the global competition of the two superpowers.
In military terms, Greece as presently allied would pose a
threat (albeit of nominal magnitude) to the interests of
the Soviet Union in the Balkans during a military conflict
with the United States. The reverse side of the coin for
the Soviets would be the significant political and military
advantages they would gain were Greece's political
orientation to shift to some form of hapless "neutrality"
vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, or even to a quasi-alliance with
the Warsaw Pact. Among other things, the small outcropping
of Turkey into Europe would be bracketed by states likely to
14

be deferential to Soviet wishes, making a Warsaw Pact
ground strike to gain the critical Turkish straits even
more likely to succeed during time of war.
Greece, as a Balkan state of considerable geostrategic
significance, therefore seems likely to command Soviet
efforts to attenuate her commitment to NATO and to adopt
policies deemed helpful to the interests of the Soviet Union.
B. THE PLACE OF GREECE IN SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE
MEDITERRANEAN
Numerous Western observers have attempted to characterize
Soviet designs, goals, and strategies in the Mediterranean,
as well as in other regions. The more cogent discussions
attempt to link Soviet actions in both the political and
military sphere to stated (or discernible) Soviet goals and
objectives." A careful review of the literature does enable
one to make several broad observations with respect to
Soviet strategic conceptions of the Mediterranean:
"See especially: Thomas W. Wolfe, "Soviet Military
Capabilities and Intentions in Europe" in Soviet Strategy
in Europe
,
Richard Pipes ed. (New York: Crane, Russak and
Co., Inc.), 19~6; John C. Campbell "Communist Strategies
in the Mediterranean," Problems of Communism , XXVIII,
(May-June 1979); John C~ Campbell , "The Mediterranean Crisis,"
Foreign Affairs
,
LIII, 4, (July 1975); and Michael MccGwire,
Ken Booth, and John McDonnel eds
.








1. The Soviets perceive the Mediterranean as a critical
water basin connecting Europe, the Balkans, the Middle East,
and Northern Africa, which affords the dominant sea power
the ability to project power in a diverse yet relatively
small area of great political and economic importance.
2. The basic instrument of Soviet policy in the region
resides in the Soviet Mediterranean "Eskadra" (Squadron)
as the most visible, powerful, and credible Soviet presence.
Soviet strategy in the Mediterranean, therefore, can to a
significant degree be discussed in terms of regional Soviet
naval policy. Curt Gasteyger has perceptively outlined
the principal raison d'etre of the Soviet Mediterranean
"Eskadra":
[its main purpose] lies in neutralizing U.S. naval
predominance, in denying or preventing unilateral
Western (U.S.) actions, and in securing permanent
access to strategically important areas within, as
well as outside, the region. Taken together, the
missions increase the number of options for Soviet
political and military actions. They provide the
framework within which the projection of Soviet
military power over long distances becomes feasible
and possible. It would therefore seem that, besides
its more regional objectives, Soviet naval policy in
the Mediterranean has to be appraised more and more as
part of its global mission and objectives. Such an
appraisal lends additional importance to what the
Soviet Union is doing in the Mediterranean and along
its shores. [Ref. 4: pp. 185]
An intermediate, yet nevertheless important mission of
the Soviet Mediterranean "Eskadra" in peacetime is that
of showing the flag in harbors of nations deemed potentially
tractable to Soviet suasion. Michael MccGwire has
characterized that practice as promoting the general
objective of "Increasing Soviet Prestige and Influence."
[Ref. 5: pp. 179]
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5. Despite improvements in the size and quality of
the Soviet Mediterranean "Eskadra," the Soviets remain
uneasy with the present correlation of forces between their
forces and those of NATO (primarily the United States Sixth
Fleet) in the Mediterranean. That uneasiness has
translated into a reluctance to bring about circumstances
thought to make likely a direct confrontation with the
United States or with NATO. Nonetheless, despite the present
asymmetry of the naval balance in the Mediterranean, Soviet
planners are likely fully aware that the United States no
longer can exercise unchallenged control of the sea.
[Ref. 6: pp. 151]
4. The Soviets are acutely aware that the acquisition of
permanent air and naval bases on the Mediterranean, if
linked by dependable land routes through friendly (or
"neutral") states to the Soviet Union, would dramatically
improve the "Eskadra's" striking and defensive capabilities.
NATO naval forces would then be confronted with a more
flexible and accurately targetable cruise missile threat
owing to the capabilities of Soviet land-based aircraft to
provide downrange guidance commands to cruise missiles
launched by ships of the Soviet "Eskadra." [Ref. 7: pp.
115-114] Dependable naval facilities (in contrast with
Soviet experiences in Egypt and uncertainty over their
Syrian/Libyan arrangements) , would considerably ease the




The purpose of the foregoing discussion has been to
provide a strategic paradigm for understanding Greece's
significance as a Mediterranean state, and to suggest that
Soviet approaches to many Mediterranean nations may be as
influenced by those nations' perceived potential for
enhancing Soviet naval power, as by other strategic and
political criteria.
Greece offers both tangible and potential benefits
to the major power she is now allied with - the United States
First, Greece has some of the finest deep water anchorages
and natural harbors found in the Mediterranean; for more
than two decades the U.S. Sixth Fleet has used Souda Bay,
Crete as a major anchorage and has made frequent port
visits to Piraeus near Athens. Second, Greece's world-
renowned shipyards can repair and rework almost any type of
vessel - including warships. Third, her huge merchant
marine of 4-9 million gross registered tons - many of whose
vessels are manned by experienced Greek sailors and officers
could be assigned significant logistical tasks in support of
NATO strategy during time of war. [Ref. 8] By way of
comparison, Turkey with a population more than four times
that of Greece has a merchant marine of but 1.3 million gross
registered tons. [Ref. 8] Fifth, Greece's array of islands
in the Northern and Eastern Aegean Sea commands the
approaches to the Dardanelles and 3osphorous. One can
imagine the unease Soviet naval strategists must feel when
18

hypothesizing sorties of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, during
time of war, through a hostile and constricted Aegean, even
assuming it were first able to transit unimpeded through
the Turkish straits. Finally, Greece possesses several
vital airfields from which U.S. and allied tactical aircraft
are capable of operating in added protection of the Sixth
Fleet. [Ref. 6: pp. 151]
In short, Greece has many characteristics relating to
her historic affinity with the Mediterranean which would
clearly serve the aims of broader Soviet naval policy in the
region, should a Greek political regime either remove
Greece from the alliance with NATO and/or become affiliated
with the Warsaw Pact.
C. THE DEVELOPMENT OF POST-WORLD WAR II SOVIET POLICIES
TOWARDS GREECE
The preceding two sections have made a case for viewing
Greece as a likely object of Soviet efforts to profoundly
alter her present NATO loyalties by any reasonable means
(according to Soviet standards) short of those which might
provoke a confrontation with the United States. Evidence of
Soviet overture is available, though not always as
definitive as one might have envisaged. At first, one
knowledgeable in the realm of Soviet-Turkish affairs might
infer that the Soviets have been so preoccupied by their more
visible exertions to wean Turkey away from the NATO alliance,
that they have overlooked some transient opportunities to
19

increase their influence in Greece. An alternative
explanation might be that their policies have been so
subtle and sophisticated that rather than generating
vigorous initiatives of their own, they have been content
to "wait-out" Greece's series of domestic identity crises
in anticipation of improved opportunities for success. The
truth probably lies somewhere between those two poles. An
integrated assessment of the Soviet role in Greece (and in
Turkey) is provided by the CSIA European Security Working
Group: "Moscow has been a residual factor, responding to
and benefitting from a disarray which it has neither created
nor been able to harness." [Ref. 6: pp. 152] While this
observer would not associate himself with that
characterization of Soviet policy towards Turkey, it does
seem pertinent in the case of Greece.
Following a brief discussion of immediate Post-World
War II Soviet policy towards Greece, key diplomatic,
political, and economic developments in Soviet-Greek
relations from the mid 1960 's until the present will be
analyzed.
1 . Post War Antecedents
Soviet policy towards Greece under Stalin was to
prove less subtle than that pursued by his successors. During
World War II Stalin had accepted Churchill's claims that
Greece should remain firmly in Great Britain's sphere of
influence. [Ref. 9: pp. 429] His perceptions of the
20

Balkans probably included the realization that, for the
present, Greece was beyond the scope of Soviet military
power.
By late 1944, a civil war developed in Greece
which was characterized by a strong Communist led
insurgency in conflict with the British supported national
government. Stalin kept a hands-off attitude towards the
premature Greek Communists' attempt to seize power in
Athens in December 1944-January 1945. [Ref. 10: pp. 49]
However, when the Communist insurgency renewed operations as
a guerrilla movement in 1946, it could count on sanctuaries
in Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria. Stalin perhaps hoped
that Greece, supported apparently by only the declining
power of Great Britain, would eventually succumb to the
Communist uprising. [Ref. 9: pp. 430] Moscow, nonetheless
seems to have provided little tangible material support to
the insurgency, although slogans, guidelines, and aphorisms
abounded. [Ref. 11: pp. 116]
Stalin's aspirations for Greece were likely
somewhat dimmed following the United States' assumption of
Great Britain's role as principal benefactor of both
Greece and Turkey in 1947. On March 12 of that year,
President Truman proclaimed what became known as the Truman
Doctrine while addressing a joint session of the Congress.
[Ref. 9: pp. 431] Truman's statement that "it must be the
policy of the United States to support free peoples who are
21

resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by
outside pressures" probably seemed a direct challenge to
Stalin's concept of the inevitable expansion of Soviet
dominions. [Ref. 9: pp. 430] Stalin's apprehensions in
that regard have been disclosed by Milovan Djilas who
recorded that Stalin was alarmed lest the guerrilla uprising
in Greece "endanger his already - won positions." [Ref. 12]
Thus, the Truman Doctrine, and its tangible application in
Greece in the form of substantial American military and
economic aid, may have given sufficient pause to Stalin that
he felt compelled to work against an uprising he had but
nominally supported anyway. As Adam Ulum notes:
Stalin [was] to decimate the Greek Communist
leadership, charging them as tainted with Titoism and
demanding that the rebels make cession of Greek
Macedonia to Bulgaria one of their postulates.
Thus the civil war in Greece came to an end.
[Ref. 10: pp. 126]
Greece formally acceded to NATO on February IS, 1952
and thereby became a willing associate of a group of states
viewed with considerable hostility and mistrust by the
Soviets. The following observation is typical of early
Soviet pronouncements on NATO:
. . . with the erection of the military political
mechanism of NATO and with the development of its
strategic doctrine, there was completed the first
stage in the policy of consolidation of aggressive
military blocs begun by the United States and other
imperialist states soon after World War II.
[Ref. 9: pp. 499]
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Greece in Stalin's view was now in the camp of his
adversaries, and, as a consequence, was to be viewed as
one. Soviet-Greek relations were at a low ebb. The post
of Soviet Ambassador to Greece, vacated in 1948, remained
empty until July of 1953, when it was filled during the
restless period in Soviet leadership following Stalin's
death.
2 . Diplomatic and Political Trends Since the Mid 1960 's
Relations between Greece and the Soviet Union
gradually assumed correct but somewhat stilted dimensions
throughout most of the Khrushchev era. Yet near the end of
Khrushchev's tenure, the Cyprus crisis of 1964 seemed to
portend a Soviet tilt towards Greece away from her
historic rival Turkey.
Greek sensitivities with respect to Turkey -
particularly when issues of dispute such as Cyprus are at
stake - are well known. In many respects Greek attitudes
towards other countries are defined by those countries'
perceived policies towards Turkey; favoritism for Turkey
translates into Greek aversion for the states alleged to
display such partiality. By the same token, criticism of
Turkey is usually viewed as a positive development in Greece
Greek perceptions of the Soviet Union, therefore, may have
been favorably influenced by Soviet pronouncements during
the' Cyprus crisis of 1964. In July of that year,
23

Khrushchev warned the Turks against invading the island,
which could cause "a dangerous chain reaction."
[Ref. 15: pp. 12] When the crisis worsened, Khrushchev
adopted a stronger line:
. . .
[he] told the Turks their use of force would
intensify the threat of war; warned that the Soviet
Union could not remain indifferent to the threat of
armed conflict near to its southern border because
the security of the country was at stake; condemned
the Turkish bombing of Cyprus; and asked what the
Turkish government would think if other countries
used the same or more serious means against its
territory and people. [Ref. 13: pp. 13]
The tough Soviet stance against Turkey during that
crisis probably evoked approval in Athens, but it is
unlikely that hopes of securing Greek good will were what
prompted Khrushchev's posturing. Moscow had real interests
in keeping Cyprus independent (in Soviet terms that means not
associated with NATO) , and probably hoped to dissuade the
most imminent threat to that independence - Turkey - from
taking action which might alter Cyprus' status.
Later, when Foreign Minister Gromyko in a statement
to Izvestiia
,
January 21, 1965, endorsed a federal solution
for Cyprus such as had long been advocated by Ankara,
Athens protested. [Ref. 13: pp. 13] That apparent shift
towards the Turkish position reflected continuing Soviet
ambivalence on the Cyprus issue. The Soviets have long
urged a peaceful settlement, yet their frequent policy
24

shifts suggest Soviet desires that the dispute continue to
be sufficiently contentious so as to preoccupy Greek and
Turkish policy makers.
Between 1967 and the Cyprus crisis of 1974, Greece
was ruled by a dictatorial clique of army officers whose
heavy-handed policies resulted not only in setbacks for
Greece, but also in the growth of profound resentment
directed against the United States. The latter developed
principally because of the popular perception in Greece
that were it not for American assistance, the junta could
neither have come into being nor continued to exist. In
point of fact, the United States pursued a two-pronged
foreign policy with respect to Greece; its public
expressions stressed the need to restore constitutional
government in Athens, while bureaucratically it supported
the Athens regime with arms, money, and tacit gestures of
approval. [Ref. 14: pp. 7]
It is interesting to note that the Soviet Union
pursued a policy not unlike that of the United States, but
with seemingly far more advantageous results. As John
Campbell observes:
While their propaganda throughout the world
condemned the brutality of the Athens regime,
the Soviet government made a point of being
correct and even cordial in its official relations
with that regime. For its part, the junta
smarting under the West's scorn, broadened its
ties with the Communist states, not only with its
immediate neighbors but, pointedly, with Moscow
as well. [Ref. 3: pp. 6]
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The Soviet Ambassador to Greece is alleged to have
welcomed the developing relations between Greece and the
Soviet Union and expressed sincere hopes for more
independent Greek policies, in a statement in January 1975
[Ref. 15] When such a statement is viewed within the
strategic context of the Balkans and the Mediterranean,
one can reasonably conclude that a barely concealed
solicitation to consider leaving NATO is what actually was
conveyed - although ignored - in this case.
During the October 1975 Middle East War Greece
mirrored almost identically the actions taken by her rival
Turkey. U.S. aircraft were prohibited from using Greek
bases to resupply Israel, yet the Soviet Union was allowed
to use Greek airspace for supply aircraft destined for her
Arab clients. [Ref. 16] That episode more likely sprang
from a complex mix of motives, .including sensitivities
vis-a-vis the Arab states coupled with a growing disdain
for the United States, than it did from friendly impulses
towards the Soviet Union. As Pierre Hassner has
trenchantly noted:
. . . relations with, and even perceptions of the
Soviet Union are determined above all by relations
with the United States and intraregional and
domestic politics ... In Greece, both the anti-
American and the regional (in this case anti-Turkish)
or domestic dimension are more pronounced [than is
the case for Turkey] . . . The legacy of the Nixon
administration's links with the colonels seems to
make Greek public opinion infinitely more anti-
American than anti-Soviet . . . [Ref. 17: pp. 127-128]
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How serious the current dimension of anti-American
feelings is in Greece can be partly gauged by assessing the
strength of anti-NATO sentiment. Those who favor a
stronger and more durable southeastern flank for NATO, this
observer included, would be dismayed by the results of a
recent opinion poll published in the Athens weekly
Tachydromos which concluded that only 12 percent of Greeks
want their country to rejoin NATO (a process that had been
underway prior to Mr. Papandreou's election victory), 58
percent desire neutrality, 27 percent have no opinion, and
5 percent want Greece to join the Warsaw Pact. [Ref. 18]
Andreas Papandreou, the popular leader of the Panhellenic
Socialist Movement (PASOK; the new majority party), has
repeatedly called for Greece to remove itself "from the cold
war bloc of NATO" terming it not even a guarantee "against
a wholly hypothetical threat from the North." [Ref. 19]
His statements in foreign affairs prior to the recent
parliamentary election frankly resembled those found in such
Soviet academic and literary journals as International
Affairs (Moscow) , and World Marxist Review . Many NATO
analysts assert that Papandreou as Prime Minister can be
expected to pursue policies which could prove exceptionally
adverse to the alliance. Although there are signs that
as Prime Minister he may be easing some of his more extreme
positions on alliance matters, his recent conduct at the
1981 NATO defense ministers' year-end review was not
27

encouraging. At the conclusion of the meeting on
December 8, 1981 he announced a "partial suspension" of
Greece's participation in NATO's military structure,
though he declined to elaborate on what such a suspension
would entail. [Ref. 20]
Much of the anti-American sentiment in Greece
(which Mr. Papandreou was able to capitalize on so well
during the fall 1981 campaign) has its origins in the
perceived inability of the United States to prevent Turkey
from launching its 1974 invasion of Cyprus.
The complex series of events which preceded the
Cyprus crisis of that year, and subsequently led to the
collapse of the colonels' regime, posed difficult choices
for both the Soviet Union and the United States alike.
Moscow reacted in a more sophisticated and evenhanded
manner towards the two antagonists - Turkey and Greece -
than it had in 1964, when Khrushchev had singled Turkey out
for exclusive admonishment. Variations in the declaratory
Soviet position since 1974 have seemed to slightly favor
Greece at times and Turkey at others. Yet generally the
Soviets have appeared reluctant to apply leverage to either
party (or to both) in hopes of achieving a settlement;
instead Cyprus has served as a useful focus for anti-NATO
blandishments and posturing. The journal International
Affairs (Moscow) has been a frequent anti-NATO instrument
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regarding the Cyprus affair. In 1974, for example, an
article entitled "The Tragedy and Hopes of Cyprus,"
asserted that:
Failing in their efforts to bring about direct
occupation of the island [in 1964] by NATO troops,
the leaders of the bloc sought to undertake new
maneuvers to achieve their goals. [Ref. 21: pp. 68]
Commenting on the 1974 Cyprus crisis, the authors made
clear who, in the Soviet view, has been behind Cyprus'
troubles
:
However, having failed [in 1974] to abolish
the sovereign Cypriot state by direct military
interference, the NATO strategists now switched
to behind-the-scenes maneuvers, expecting to
solve the problem of Cyprus in the narrow circle
of NATO member states
. . . Although hostilities
on Cyprus have ceased, the situation is still
fraught with complications, for their main cause -
the interference of NATO in the affairs of the
country - has not been removed. [Ref. 21:
pp. 72 and 75]
Soviet condemnations, shrewdly designed to single out
neither Greece nor Turkey for special criticism - have likely
helped contribute to a growth in general anti-NATO feelings
in both countries, more discernible in Greece than in Turkey.
In the wake of the 1974 Cyprus crisis, Greece decided to
withdraw from the NATO integrated military structure. That
move seems to have been principally motivated by the great
frustration Greece felt with the alliance owing to NATO's
inability to prevent one of its members from moving to the
brink of war with another member. Soviet anti-NATO
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pronouncements likely played only a marginal role in the
Greek decision, but Soviet commentators, reacted with ill-
disguised delight:
The decision to withdraw from NATO's military
organization was widely and warmly greeted by the
Greek people, who learned the sad experiences of
"cooperation" with that aggressive bloc. A mighty
wave of demonstrations swept the country against
participation in NATO, against the military presence
of the United States , and urging Greece to pursue
an independent foreign policy . [Ref. 21: pp. 74]
Moscow's policy with respect to the Cyprus dispute
therefore seems to have been inspired by cautious and
unstated hopes for promoting discord between the two nations
and their NATO allies by denigrating the common alliance.
Prudently, Moscow has been careful to avoid overly
belligerent pronouncements on the Cyprus matter which could
induce renewed wariness of the Soviet Union, such as that
which prompted the two antagonists to join NATO in the early
1950's. [Ref. 13: pp. 13-14]
In September 1978, then Greek Foreign Minister
George Rallis (until recently the Prime Minister) visited
the Soviet Union, the first such visit since the establish-
ment of relations between the two countries in 1924.
[Ref. 6: pp. 161] The visit probably had more symbolic
than substantive significance, but the Soviets were able to
make some diplomatic gains. A Soviet consulate in
Thessaloniki (Salonika) was established, as was a Greek
consulate in the Black Sea port of Odessa. [Ref. 6: pp. 161]
30

More importantly, two Greek destroyers made a port call in
Odessa later that month which was reciprocated by the visit
of Soviet warships to Athens' port city of Piraeus.
[Ref. 22]
Following by only three months the historic visit
of Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit to the Soviet Union,
the Rallis visit may have been motivated on the Greek side
by wariness of the apparent courtship of the Soviet Union
being undertaken by Greece's traditional rival Turkey.
Greece likely reasoned that if Turkey could flirt with the
Soviet Union and thereby gain greater attention from the
United States (the Turkish arms embargo was revoked by the
U.S. Congress two months after the Ecevit visit to the
Soviet Union) , then Greece might find such an approach
advantageous as well. In terms of their impact on Soviet-
Greek relations, the Rallis visit in 1978 and a visit by
Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis in 1979 to the Soviet Union,
were far more modest in scope than those carried out by
their Turkish counterparts - reflective, in part, of the
more conservative nature of the Greek politicians. No
agreements such as the Soviet-Turkish Political Document on
the Principles of Good Neighborly and Friendly Co-operation
were entered into by the Greeks, yet Soviet objectives may
have been partially achieved in that those trips were made
at all. By supplementing essentially low-key propaganda
themes such as "the ever peaceful intentions of the Soviet
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Union," and "the myth of the Soviet threat" with friendly
personal contact at the highest governmental levels,
Moscow might have hoped for second thoughts on the parts
of Rallis and Karamanlis about the Soviet menace NATO is
meant to hold in check. Subsequent statements and policies
of both leaders, each of whom has been Prime Minister, have
been generally pro-NATO whatever changes, if any, may have
occurred in their perceptions of the threat posed by the
Soviet Union.
Transient rifts in Greek-American relations have not
gone unnoticed nor unexploited (albeit with inconclusive
results) by the Soviet Union. The recent "March through
Drama" incident and the relevation of the Mil]s-Chrisospathis
note provide a telling example of Soviet alertness.
The "March through Drama" incident came about
because a young U.S. Army Officer apparently ordered his
detail of 20 men to conduct a march through the Greek town
of that name in mid-February 1981. His men were wearing
chemical warfare protective clothing, which apparently
alarmed the townspeople. [Ref. 23] Subsequent to that
incident, local Greek photographers discovered a heretofore
unknown American installation in the vicinity, whose
"^For a classis presentation of Soviet views on the nature
of NATO and the Warsaw Pact see Boris Ponomarev, "A Pact for
Peace and a Pact for Aggression," World Marxist Review , XXIII,
8, (August 1980), pp. 3-10.
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structures seemed to suggest the presence of nuclear
warheads - already the subject of strenuous debate in the
the Greek parliament. [Ref. 23] Profoundly embarrassed,
the U.S. ambassador offered a public apology in response
to a formal Greek protest, complaining about the unusual
march.
Less than a week later, the New York Times and
the New Statesman published reports which revealed the
existence of a previously secret note which excluded
Greek control over U.S. nuclear warheads stored in the
country. [Ref. 24] Signed by the deputy chief of the U.S.
Mission in Athens, Hawthorn Mills and the Greek government
representative, Spiros Chrisospathis , the two sides agreed
in the memorandum that the U.S. -Greek defense cooperation
agreement of 28 July 1977 'does not apply to the United
States nuclear custodial units stationed in Greece.'
[Ref. 25] Although the thrust of the note was certainly
consistent with .American practices elsewhere, its revelation
caused a storm of protest in the Greek parliament and in the
country as well. On February 28, 1981, Andreas Papandreou,
the then principal opposition leader and now Prime Minister,
said the disclosures proved that the government has
"surrendered Greece to the United States as its private
property," and he declared that "The least demanded today in
the resignation of the entire government." [Ref. 24]
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In early April, less than two months after those two
controversies surfaced, Soviet President Brezhnev made a
pointed offer to Greece during an interview with an Athens
newspaper editor. Brezhnev stated that Greece would be
guaranteed immunity from a Soviet nuclear attack in exchange
for an undertaking by .Greece not to store nuclear weapons on
its territory. [Ref. 26] The Brezhnev offer was rejected
by the Greek government almost immediately, but it may have
looked appealing to many in Greece - particularly to those
politically to the left of center such as Andreas Papandreou.
This Soviet overture has been a standard line since the
1950 's, but it is often repeated when thought potentially
advantageous to do so by the Soviets.
3 . Economic Relations
Greece and the Soviet Union have recently begun to
expand trade relations and cooperation, partially owing to
the impetus provided by the aforementioned trip of Greek
Foreign Minister Rallis to the Soviet Union in September 1978
Among economic matters on his agenda were proposals to
(a) establish an alumina plant in Greece with Soviet
equipment, (b) purchase Soviet natural gas and electric power
for Greece, and (c) make Greek shipyards outside Athens
available for the repair of Soviet merchant ships. [Ref. 27]
Since that trip, subsequent agreements made in 1979 and in
1981 resulted in: (a) substantial purchases of Soviet crude
oil by Greece, now at a level of two million tons per annum;
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(b) provisions for the supply of between 1 and 2 million
cubic meters of Soviet natural gas per annum; (c) signi-
ficant purchases of Soviet electrical power; and (d) pledges
to expand Soviet imports of Greek citrus, tobacco, clothing,
and footwear. [Ref. 28]
The only "economic" agreement between Greece and the
Soviet Union which aroused concerned interest in NATO
circles was a Greek offer in 1979 to make the Neorion
Shipyards available for repair of Soviet naval auxiliary
vessels as well as Soviet merchant ships. That arrangement
was viewed with misgivings by the alliance since in theory
it enabled the Soviet Union to extend the tour of duty of
naval auxiliaries in the Mediterranean, which otherwise would
have been forced to go to Soviet Black Sea shipyards for
repairs. [Ref. 29] However, following the rejoining of
Greece to the military arm of the NATO alliance in
October 1980, it was decided to cancel that arrangement with
the Soviets. [Ref. 29] Such a decision is thought to have
been unlikely had the leftist, then opposition leader,
Andreas Papandreou been Prime Minister instead of the
conservative George Rallis.
Notwithstanding that contretemps, the Greeks and
Soviets seem intent on gradually increasing economic
cooperation between their two countries. .Greek motivations
are very likely apolitical; the Greeks are simply trying to
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diversify their sources of critical fuel and electricity
requirements and simultaneously to improve their balance of
payments position through an expansion of exports.
Soviet motivations, though more difficult to gauge
assuredly contain political components as well as economic
ones. In keeping with Soviet efforts to achieve credibility
as a trustworthy and reliable partner, economic agreements
with countries outside the Warsaw Pact provide opportunities
to demonstrate Soviet "good faith" on matters unlikely to
result in challenges to that "good faith." There is,
moreover, always the possibility that the political influence
of the Soviet Union will increase in countries such as Greece
which have become modestly dependent on Soviet deliveries of
crude oil, natural gas, and electricity. As a Soviet
commentator candidly noted when writing about expanding Soviet
trade with Greece's neighbor, Turkey:
Political tendencies are greatly influenced by
economic factors whose effect intensifies as
various propaganda- induced prejudices disappear
[and new ones are encouraged, one might add].
[Ref. 50: pp. 37]
D. A SUMMING UP: SOVIET CONDUCT TOWARDS GREECE
The Soviet Union is not insensitive to Greece's
strategic significance as a Balkan power and Mediterranean
state partially filling the critical void between European
Turkey and Italy. To achieve a substantial reorientation of
Greece's present pro-NATO alignment to some sort of
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accommodation with the Soviet Union would so plainly be in
Soviet interests that it must be considered an important
potential Soviet objective. In order to achieve that aim,
the evidence suggests that the Soviets have adopted a
sophisticated and unobtrusive approach to Greece encompassing
the following dimensions: (a) diplomatic efforts to
continue improvements in Greek-Soviet state relations and to
encourage Greek perceptions of growing Soviet reliability
and respectability; (b) encouragement of Greek-Soviet trade
agreements, with emphasis on increasing sales of critical
fuels and electricity to Greece; (c) a readiness to exploit
to the Soviet advantage issues arising from strains in Greek-
American relations; and (d) misrepresentation of various
features of the Cyprus issue as a means of expressing
condemnation and derision of NATO.
To date, the Soviets have had limited success in
enhancing their influence in Greece. Yet they remain
keenly aware of the near mathematical precision with which
increases in anti-American sentiment are linked to decreases
in the perceived seriousness of the threat which they pose to
Greece. The Soviet Union can, as a consequence, be expected
to continue its efforts to exaggerate the effects of American




Similarly the Soviets perceive that the accession to
the post of Prime Minister by the charismatic Andreas
Papandreou could bring about what heretofore has been most
unlikely of success - the withdrawal of Greece from NATO.
The kind of hopes the Soviets entertain in that respect
are only transparently concealed in their commentaries:
The people persistently demand that the dangerous
aggressive plans be scrapped and that a constructive
answer be given to the peaceful initiatives of the
socialist states. Calls are sounding in a number of
countries to part company with NATO's aggressive
policy by withdrawing from the bloc . . . Broad
democratic circles in Greece are also demanding their
country's withdrawal from the North Atlantic alliance,
instead of its return to the bloc's military
organization. [Ref. 31: pp. 36]
If the "self -Finlandization" of Greece is one goal Mr.
Papandreou hopes to achieve (although he would not use that
term) , then the strategic implications of his victory may
prove to be graver than many in the West now realize. Since
assuming office as Prime Minister in late October 1981, he
has refrained from precipitous implementation of his party's
principal foreign policy campaign pledges to (a) withdraw
Greece from NATO, and (b) cancel American base rights in
Greece. His recent comments during an interview with ABC
News would seem to indicate that Mr. Papandreou is attempting
to affect a more moderate image now that he must contend with
the realities of managing Greece's affairs. For example, in
responding to a query concerning Greece's relations with NATO
he said "We have no desire to take our country into any
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adventure." [Ref. 32] In commenting on the question of
American base rights, Mr. Papandreou said, "We are not
prepared to move unilaterally. And this really means that
we shall start negotiations both on the question of the
participation in the military branch of the Atlantic
alliance and on the question of American bases." [Ref. 32]
The manner in which Greece, at Mr. Papandreou ' s behest,
carries out those negotiations will provide her NATO allies
a sound indication of long term Greek intentions and
reliability in the context of the alliance. As noted
earlier, Mr. Papandreou's declaration in Brussels on
December 8, 1981 that Greece would put into effect a
"partial suspension" of its participation in NATO's
military structure was not a reassuring sign. [Ref. 20]
The Soviet Union, of course, would be only too ready
to expand upon and complete its long-term ambitions for
Greece through close association with a leader whose
foreign policy views appear generally harmonious with its
own, and whose prominent anti-American biases have been a
defining characteristic. New Soviet overtures have already
been conveyed; reacting with impressive but not unexpected
alacrity to the election results, the Soviets on
October 19, 1981 reaffirmed their offer to certify Greek
immunity from Soviet nuclear attack in exchange for removal




III. SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS TURKEY
To a great extent - perhaps more than is the case with
any West European country save the Federal Republic of
Germany - Soviet policy towards Turkey has been defined,
shaped, and tempered by Soviet conceptions of Turkey's
essential strategic worth. Turkey is simultaneously a
Balkan state, an Eastern Mediterranean littoral state, a
country of the Middle East, and the manager and sentinel of
the vital Turkish Straits. The significance of Turkey's
pivotal location has been reinforced by the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan and by the implications of persistent
turmoil in Iran.
As a consequence, an appraisal of Soviet foreign
policy towards Turkey should begin with an attempt to
bring into focus Turkey's position in the context of
Soviet regional aspirations and strategies. As with the
Greek case, public expression of these Soviet aspirations
and strategies has been periodically adjusted (though not
always very effectively) to respond to both Turkish domestic
political change and to variations in Turkey's relations
with other countries. These strategies have furthermore
been conditioned by two important factors applying not only
to Turkey, but to Soviet conduct towards many other West
European countries as well.
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The first factor has been the strong Soviet impulse
to increase political leverage over the formulation of
both the foreign and domestic policy within countries near
Soviet borders or domains in Eastern Europe. Termed by
many Western observers the Soviet quest for "Finlandization,"
this Soviet objective envisions, as trenchantly noted by
Alvan I. Rubinstein:
A process whereby the Soviet Union influences the
domestic and foreign policy behavior of non-
communist countries in a way that leads them to
follow policies congenial to or approved by the
Soviet Union. [Ref. 34: pp. 103j
The second factor (which has, to the present, helped
hold the first in check) has been Soviet reluctance to
bring about circumstances which could likely result in
direct military confrontation with the United States. This
latter factor may not be a completely reliable indicator of
future Soviet conduct in that it originally stemmed from
Soviet uneasiness over the uncertain consequences of military
confrontation with a strategically superior United States.
Now that the United States has difficulty even laying claim
to strategic sufficiency, much less superiority, this
dimension of Soviet conduct may give way to less inhibited
4
and bolder Soviet advances.
This interpretation has been developed by observers
such as Henry Kissinger and Uwe Nerlich and is endorsed by
this writer/ It is disputed by McGeorge Bundy and others.
See, for example, Henry N. Kissinger, "The Future of NATO."
The Washington Quarterly , II, (Autumn 1979); Uwe Nerlich
"Theatre Nuclear Forces' in Europe: Is NATO Running Out of
Options?", The Washington Quarterly , III, (Winter 1980);






The following three themes are central to understanding
Soviet foreign policy towards Turkey:
1. The Place of the Turkish Straits in Soviet
Strategy
;
2. Turkey's Role in Soviet Strategies in the Mediterranean
and the Middle East; and
5. The Development of Post-World War II Soviet policies
Towards Turkey.
A. THE PLACE OF THE TURKISH STRAITS IN SOVIET STRATEGY
Turkey's status as a Balkan power is derived from her
modest outcropping into Europe known as European Thrace.
Half of her Thracian border - the western portion - is
shared with Greece, while the northern edge of Turkish
Thrace separates her from Bulgaria. Despite this region's
small size, it provides Turkey decisive command of the three
critical bodies of water separating the Black Sea from the
Mediterranean which are known collectively as the Turkish
Straits: the Bosphorous in the northeast, the sea of
Marmara in the center, and the Dardanelles in the southwest.
Additionally, Turkey's largest city and most important
commercial center - Istanbul - brackets the Bosphorous.
Historically, the Straits have served as the principal
channel for Russia's trade with southern Europe, Asia, and
Africa. [Ref. 55: pp. 695] The Straits also provide the
Soviets - assuming unimpeded transit - the most convenient
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and speediest method of reinforcing their naval presence
in the Mediterranean in time of crisis (or anticipated
crisis)
,
their only other options being time-consuming
movement of ships from the Baltic, Northern or Pacific
fleets .
Given Turkey's status as a member of NATO, the Straits
could enable the U.S. Sixth Fleet and allied units in
certain scenarios to project naval power northeastward
through the Straits into the Black Sea, and as a consequence,
to threaten significant Soviet forces and installations.
Although such an eventuality might appear extremely
unlikely to Western observers, one should not underestimate
the Soviet penchant to prepare to hinder and frustrate in
advance exercise of such Western military options.
Turkish possession of the Straits poses a further obstacle
to Soviet contingency planning because of the ease with
which its key choke points could be effectively mined by the
Turks - even assuming the rapid success of a Warsaw Pact
ground strike originating in Bulgaria which had as its aim
the capture of the Straits.
Presently all merchant and naval traffic through the
Straits is subject to the terms of the Montreux Convention
which has been in effect since July 20, 1936. While the
main purpose of the Convention was to limit the freedom of
nonriparian states to enter the Black Sea, significant
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discretionary powers were awarded Turkey which had not been
hers under the previous arrangement, the Lausanne Convention
[Ref. 55: pp. ~00]
The Soviets have for the most part been careful to
adhere to the Convention's requirements (with the possible
exception of the transit of the Kiev in July 1976) . Given
the increasingly greater prominence that they attach to
naval power, one can nonetheless assume that the Soviets do
not view indefinite administration of the Straits by a NATO
state with favor. The Turks, for their part, have generally
been vigilant and meticulous in exercising their
responsibilities
:
. . . Turkish authorities have consistently held up
passage [of Soviet warships] until the specific
hour and date requested, as required, eight days in
advance for all foreign warships. [Ref. 56: pp. 60]
The previously mentioned transit of the Soviet capital ship
Kiev perhaps marked the one major lapse in Turkish
stringency vis-a-vis naval movement through the Straits.
In addition to the peacetime inconveniences which
Turkish ownership of the Straits poses the Soviet Union,
Soviet planners face dismaying prospects of: (1) uncertain
or impeded Soviet naval movement southwestward during time
of war, and (2) potential wartime U.S. naval strikes through
the Straits to the northeast against Soviet territory.
Change in political orientation on the part of the Turks,
to one of habitual conformance to Soviet wishes, would yield
the Soviets an impressive strategic advantage.
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By virtue of possessing the Straits, Turkey therefore
seems likely to be an important focal point of Soviet
efforts: (a) to gradually bring her policies into general
alignment with those of the Soviet Union, and, (b) in
the long run, to entice her away from the NATO alliance.
B. TURKEY'S ROLE IN SOVIET STRATEGIES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
AND THE MIDDLE EAST
Soviet hopes, goals, and strategies in the Mediterranean
and the Middle East have been characterized bv a general
similarity in both political and military dimensions. This
is not surprising, since two parameters tend to shape Soviet
approaches toward both areas. The first is the obvious
geopolitical overlap of the littoral nations bordering the
Eastern and Southern Mediterranean with much of the Middle
East. Only the northern tier state of Afghanistan and the
nations of the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf do
not border the Mediterranean; and even the latter group
in many respects has been affected by periodic political
and military strife occurring in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Second, the most visible and important instruments of
Soviet policy in both regions reside in the Soviet
Mediterranean "Eskadra" (Squadron) and, to a lesser degree,
in the Soviet Navy's Indian Ocean contingent. Despite
massive efforts to acquire permanent air and ground force
base right and installations in what once appeared to be
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pliant candidates (i.e. Egypt of the early 1970's, Syria,
Iraq, and most recently Libya), the Soviets have generally
been thwarted from achieving such gains.
The continuing paramountcy of the "Eskadra" as the
Soviet Union's most credible and effective military
presence in the Mediterranean suggests, as pointed out in an
earlier chapter, that Soviet strategies in that region,
and in the Middle Eastern nations bordering the Mediterranean,
can be discussed to a significant degree in terms of
regional naval policy.
Nevertheless, these are a number of features and
conditions uniaue to the Middle East which serve to define
°Scme observers might suggest that the large number
of Soviet advisors in Libya provides the Soviet Union de
facto base rights, though the nature of Soviet access to
Libyan facilities remains open to question. Additionally,
the level of military cooperation between the Soviets and
Their clients in Ethiopia and the Peoples Democratic Republic
of Yemen (PDYR) is growing.
c
""lease refer to chatter two for an overview of
Soviet strategic conceptions regarding the Mediterranean.
Turkey's lengthy Aegean and Mediterranean coasts probably
figure in Soviet appraisals of Turkey's value as a maritime
state. There are three Turkish ports on those coasts
which currently support the Turkish Navy: Izmir, Mersin,
and Iskenderun. A NATC fuel facility at Iskenderun
stores about twenty oercent of the estimated needs of the
t. [Ref. U3: pp.8]
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a more distinctive set of Soviet strategic considerations
than a simple linkage of the Mediterranean and Middle
Eastern theatres might imply. The more significant of
these follow:
1. The Soviets perceive that the state of Arab-Israeli
relations has a profound impact on their ability to
ingratiate themselves with local Arab regimes and to widen
their influence in the Middle East. By sustaining whenever
possible a low to moderate level of Arab-Israeli tension,
the Soviets can portray, as Galia Golan notes, "... the
Arabs' need for Soviet assistance" against the backdrop of
"the polarization of the superpowers' positions and
America's commitment to the enemy side, Israel."
[Ref. 37: pp. 113]
2. The Soviets are well aware of the continuing
dependence of almost all of the major Western industrial
societies on unhindered importation of oil from the Middle
East and Persian Gulf. Additionally, the wide range of
energy dependence in the Western camp, the general European
ambivalence towards Israel (which contrasts with the
consistent support accorded by the United States) , and
differing domestic political constraints, have made it clear
to the Soviets that the West is chronically divided
concerning Middle Eastern energy policy. [Ref. 38: pp. 213]
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The Soviets, it must be presumed, might attempt to
exploit this Western vulnerability at an opportune moment.
[Ref. 38: pp. 215]
A countervailing and emerging concern for the Soviets
has been noted by Geoffrey Kemp:
The Soviet Union ... is only beginning to face the
realities of its own energy crisis and the constrain-
ing effect that will have on its own economic growth,
which is abysmally low, expecially in agriculture and
consumer goods. [Ref. 38: pp. 211]
As that concern intensifies in the Soviet Union - a country
whose leadership is well aware that their nation could never
hope to sustain an economic competition with the West for
increasingly scarce Middle Eastern and Persian Gulf oil -
the temptation to attempt riskier political gambles, or even
to exert military ventures to secure access to portions of
the region's oil-producing territory will probably also
•grow.
3. On the whole, the Soviet Union has benefited from
the fall of the Shah, and from the chronic political
instability and deterioration in military readiness which
have ensued in Iran over the last three years. Moreover,
as Alvin Rubinstein notes, "Moscow ... is well positioned
to exploit any revolutionary surge to the left or possibly
internal disintegration." [Ref. 39: pp. 325] And,
unlike the Soviet thrust into Afghanistan, a Soviet military
move into Iran could cloak itself (for propaganda purposes)
with the vestiges of international vindication by invoking
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the Soviet - Persian treaty of February 26, 1921. The key
provisions of that treaty permit the Soviet Union to move
onto Iranian territory should forces "hostile" to the USSR
enter that country. [Ref. 40: pp. 54]
The foregoing three-tiered framework of Soviet Middle
Eastern strategic considerations can be briefly summarized
in terms of broader Soviet objectives and/or desired
capabilities as follows: (a) to sustain a low to moderate
level of Arab-Israeli discord; (b) to keep the West
divided on the Middle East energy question, and, if necessary
to be able to quickly acquire control of key Middle East oil-
producing territories; and (c) to maintain vigilance over
developments in Iran, with a view towards possible
exploitation of any ensuing political dissolution in that
country.
This is not to suggest that the Soviets now are
seriously contemplating overt military moves in the region.
The point is that implementation of Soviet regional contin-
gency plans under crisis or near-crisis conditions would
require commitments of considerable air and ground forces
working in concert with the Soviet Mediterranean "Eskadra"
and with the Soviet Indian Ocean contingent.
It is in the context of these regional Soviet military
and naval strategic considerations that the significance
and value of Turkey can be appropriately addressed. Much
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of Turkey's value to NATO and to the United States stems,
of course, from her unique geopolitical position in the
Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Possessing
some 308 miles of mutual border with the Soviet Union
(only one other NATO state - Norway - has a frontier with
the Soviet Union) and the greatest extent of Black Sea
coastline of any country save the USSR, Turkey is a
"confrontation" state by definition. Her long and desolate
Southern border directly abuts two of the Middle East's
most frequently volatile actors: Syria and Iraq. Further
east, Turkey shares a long and ruggedly mountainous frontier
with Iran. Thus, Turkey physically separates the Soviet
Union from all her past and present Arab client states and,
owing to her continued membership in the NATO alliance, has
served as a major barrier to bolder projections of Soviet
power in both the Eastern Mediterranean and in the Middle
East. Contemplation by the Soviet leadership of military
options to sway events, for example, in a Lebanese or
Iraqi internal crisis, or during a future Israeli-Syrian
war, is made more difficult by their awareness that any
forcible projection across Turkish territory could immediately
raise the stakes and risks from the context of a regional
calculus, to that of a global and strategic one, even before
Soviet forces join the fray.
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Turkey's geographic position and NATO membership have
also served to complicate Soviet defensive considerations;
for, as Lothar Ruehl has noted:
. . . [Turkey] has put large parts of the Soviet
Union within relatively easy reach of Western arms
and, at times, has allowed NATO and the U.S. to
deploy operational dual-purpose counter-options
against Soviet targets of considerable significance
for the defense of Southern as well as of Central
Europe. Turkey, as an active NATO ally, puts
Russia into the two-front situation in Europe.
[Ref. 41]
Turkey offers the NATO alliance and the United States
other tangible benefits besides those accruing from her key
location. First, Turkey maintains, along with the Federal
Republic of Germany, one of the two largest NATO military
forces in the European theater. [Ref. 42: pp. 610]
Estimates vary, but of approximately 566,000 men under arms
in the Turkish Armed Forces 425,000 are assigned to her
impressive and spirited army, the second largest in NATO
after the United States. [Ref. 45: pp. 15] Few doubt
that the Soviets have a wary respect for the Turkish
soldier's fighting capabilities, convincingly displayed
during the Korean conflict. NATO's Secretary General
Joseph Luns has referred to the Turks as "the last of the
Prussians," an observation with which the Soviet military
would probably grudgingly agree. [Ref. 44]
Second, the still impressive array of U.S. installations
throughout Turkey provides the United States timely
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intelligence about Soviet military activities. Among the
most important of these have been: (a) Diyarbakir, a long-
range radar and communications station in east-central
Turkey, (b) Belbasi, a U.S. seismographic detection base
near Ankara, and (c) the electronic- intelligence gathering
facilities at Sinop, on the Black Sea coast, and at Kara-
it
mursel, on the Sea of Marmara. [Ref: 45] Collectively
they have proved vital in monitoring Soviet missile tests,
troop movements, and nuclear explosions. [Ref. 46: pp. 567]
Moreover, it must be assumed that these installations have
assumed much greater importance in both Western and Soviet
eyes following the loss of American monitoring sites in Iran
in 1979.
Finally, the interceptor and fighter aircraft assigned
to the NATO air base at Incirlik, and to several other
vital Turkish air bases, working in concert with the
fourteen NADGE (NATO Air Defense Ground Environment) early
warning sites located in Turkey, could provide substantial
assistance in the anti-air warfare defense of the Sixth
Fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean. As a consequence, the
Soviet Mediterranean "Eskadra's" sea denial mission against
the U.S. Sixth Fleet would be rendered even less certain of
success in time of war, owing to unavoidable attrition of
many supporting Soviet-based aircraft attempting passage
through Turkish air space.
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In sum, the Soviets surely sense that were a Turkish
political regime to withdraw from NATO and attempt to
pursue some form of "neutrality," the Soviet ability to
achieve strategic aims in the Middle East, the Eastern
Mediterranean, and even in the Persian Gulf would
measurably improve. Not only would NATO lose a physical and
psychological barrier of paramount geopolitical importance,
but a major source of crucial intelligence on Soviet military
activities would disappear as well.
C. THE DEVELOPMENT OF POST-WORLD WAR II SOVIET POLICIES
TOWARDS TURKEY
The preceding two sections furnish a basis for judging
Soviet efforts to alter Turkey's present NATO loyalties to
some form of accommodation, either explicit or tacit, with
the policies of the Soviet Union are likely. Evidence of
Soviet overtures to Turkey is, in fact, considerable. In
comparison with the Soviet Union's muted efforts in the case
of Greece, an analysis of its policies towards Turkey since
the end of the Second World War - and in particular during
the last two decades - reveals a more substantive Soviet
effort to separate Turkey politically from her Western allies,
and to isolate her militarily.
The following section traces the development of post-
World War II Soviet policy towards Turkey with particular

emphasis on the key diplomatic, political, and economic
developments in Soviet-Turkish relations of the last two
decades
.
1 . Post War Antecedents
Prior to the onset of World War II, Soviet-Turkish
relations were markedly good. Both nations had undergone
wrenching social revolutions, and both pursued foreign
policies largely isolated from the Western-dominated
international community. In the 1925 Treaty of Neutrality
and Nonaggression, the Soviet Union and Turkey vowed not to
interfere in each other's internal affairs. As Nuri Eren
perceptively notes:
It [the treaty] . . . provided the official frame of
their new and close relationship. With no ambition
beyond their borders, the two revolutionary regimes
found themselves natural allies in a semihostile
world. [Ref. 47: pp. 15]
Indications that that period of mutual trust was to
come to a sudden end occurred concomitant with the outbreak
of the Second World War. In Moscow, in October 1959 Stalin
had his Foreign Commissar Molotov submit two strongly worded
proposals to the visiting Turkish Foreign Minister
" "
-v
Sukru Saraco^lu: (I) to prohibit French and British warships
from passage through the Turkish Straits, and (2) to
conclude a mutual assistance pact with the Soviet Union,
thus drawing Turkey away from an alliance she had been
contemplating with Britain and France. [Ref. 55: pp. 128]
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Although Turkey resolutely refused to accede to
these demands , no doubt they added to a general sense of
foreboding Turkey had with respect to her vulnerabilities
as a relatively weak power during that dangerous and fast-
moving period.
Turkey remained a neutral throughout most of the
war, but some modest assistance provided the Allied powers
particularly Great Britain and France - revealed her
preferences, in principle, for an Allied victory. Non-
theless, Stalin seems to have felt little but disdain and
resentment for Russia's historic enemy, which stemmed not
only from Turkey's studied neutrality, but also from her
previous rejection of his proposals of 1939 - when Stalin
had been struggling to mollify his nominal ally Nazi
Germany.
As the fighting drew to a close in 1945, Stalin
again turned his attention to Turkey, perhaps hopeful that
the emerging domination of the Red Army in Eastern and
Central Europe could be influential in attaining gains for
the Soviet Union at Turkey's expense. On March 21, 1945
the Soviets denounced the Soviet-Turkish pact of 1925 and
declined to renew it. [Ref. 35: pp. 135] Later, in June
of that year, the Soviets made clear that four conditions
would have to be fulfilled by Turkey if she wished to have
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the nonaggression treaty renewed. As summarized by
George Lenczowski, the Soviet demands included:
1. the return to Russia of Kars and Ardahan [provinces
in Eastern Turkey]
;
2. the granting of military bases in the Bosphorous
and the Dardanelles;
5. a revision of the Montreux Straits Convention; and,
4. a revision of the Thracian boundary in favor of
Communist-dominated Bulgaria. [Ref. 35: pp. 135]
Those demands were rejected by the deeply worried
Turks, who commenced a campaign to enlist American support
for their refusal to yield to the increasing Soviet
pressures. That campaign, though slow to develop, proved
most successful from the Turkish perspective during that
period when Stalin's demands were at their peak - in
August 1946.
On August 7, the Kremlin sent a brusque note to
Turkey containing complaints over Turkey's administration
of the Turkish Straits during the war and repeating demands
for shared control of the waterway; ominously, the demarche
was accompanied by Soviet military activity in the 31ack Sea
and in the Caucasus. [Ref. 48: pp. 21] The Turks
rejected the Soviet note, and elicited a U.S. repudiation of
it as well. In the U.S. note to the Soviets of
August 19, 1946, the United States strongly backed the
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Turkish stand and asserted that attacks on or threats of
attack against the Straits would be matters for action by
the United Nations Security Council. [Ref. 48: pp. 22]
The firm American stand was very likely a powerful
factor influencing Moscow's decision to ease the pressure
on Turkey in late 1946. Soviet pronouncements with respect
to claims on Turkish territory became less frequent and
rather perfunctory. Stalin's aspirations no doubt were
further dampened following President Truman's proclamation
of the Truman Doctrine on March 12, 1947. The Truman
Doctrine - just as had been the case with previous
declarations of American support - was welcomed with
considerable relief and satisfaction by the Turks. Moreover,
it had the additional consequences of: (a) associating
Turkey, in Stalin's eyes, more closely with his feared and
powerful rival, the United States, and (b) encouraging the
foreign policy elite in Turkey to realize that their
country's chief hopes lay in continued affiliation with
the West, and in particular with the United States.
Just as had been the case with Greece, Turkey's
accession to the North Atlantic Alliance on February 18, 1952
formalized her growing turn to the West, which - particularly
in the case of Turkey - had been to a significant extent
prompted by fears of Soviet belligerence. Moscow's reaction
57

was predictable in the context of the growing rigidity of
the Cold War, declaring that it "could not remain
indifferent" to the inclusion of Turkey in the pact and
terming it a "provocative act." [Ref. 49: pp. 33]
Stalin's death in March 1953 ushered in a restless
period for the top echelons of the Soviet leadership, which
was characterized not only by a struggle for the key
positions in the hierarchy, but also by uncertainty over
the prudence of Stalin's adversarial approach to the West.
That uncertainty presaged a period during which some of the
more immoderate Soviet claims and foreign policy stances
were visibly attenuated. As George S. Harris notes:
Turkey was one of the first areas where the new
spirit was expressed. On May 30, 1953, the Soviet
Union officially renounced its territorial claims
on Turkey, stating in a note to Ankara that Moscow
had also changed its mind about the need to share
in control of the Straits. [Ref. 49: pp. 34]
The Turks for their part were suspicious about
this sudden Soviet about-face. Their instinctive distrust
of the Russians, forged during thirteen Russo-Turkish wars,
had been revived by Stalin's intimidating maneuvers; new
Soviet expressions of hope for friendship and better
relations between the two countries were therefore suspect
in the eyes of Ankara.
In fact, in February 1955, two years after the
Soviet renunciation of territorial claims on Turkey, the
Baghdad Pact was formed, completing one more geographical
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link in the American- inspired "containment" barrier around
the Soviet Union. At the urging of John Foster Dulles,
Turkey's Prime Minister Adnan Menderes had been instrumental
in coordinating Iranian, Iraqi, and Pakistani agreement to
join Turkey and Great Britain in the alliance.
[Ref. 43: pp. 62]
Soviet policy towards Turkey during the Khrushchev
era reflected both Khrushchev's capricious personal style
and the difficult problems which confronted Soviet foreign
policy in the post-Stalin period. On one hand, Turkey's
membership in the Western- inspired NATO and CENTO pacts
prompted a Soviet propaganda litany deriding this aspect
of Turkish policy, typified in remarks by Khrushchev
himself:
The governments of Iran and Turkey can hardly be
said to be acting wisely in casting their lot
with the aggressive Baghdad pact and refusing to
establish good-neighbor, friendly relations with
the Soviet Union. [Ref. 50: pp. 30]
Yet on the other hand, Khrushchev seems to have felt
compelled to adjust for a while, at any rate, to the
realities of the Western alliance system and to the loyalties
required of its membership. The Soviet journal International
Affairs was an early vehicle for this more moderate Soviet
view:
While advocating normal relations with Turkey,
the Soviet Union by no means seeks to impair
Turkey's relations with the United States, Britain,
or any other Western country. In fact, acting
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on the principle of peaceful co-existence, it
favors broader co-operation between all countries
of the world
. . .
The Soviet people are convinced that a revival
of the old Soviet-Turkish friendship is vital to the
peoples of Turkey and the Soviet Union and that both
countries stand to gain by better relations.
[Ref. 51: pp. 62]
The Turks maintained a practice of ignoring both
Soviet verbal hostility and Soviet pleas for a "normal-
ization." Their disdain for Soviet policies was motivated
by latent anti-Russian impulses, and it also found
reassurance in the Cold War stance of Turkey's principal
mentor - the United States. But Turkey's developing ties
to the United States were to be shaken in the 1960 's.
2. Diplomatic and Political Trends of the 1960 's
The state of American-Turkish relations to some
extent has acted, over the past twenty years, as a crude but
effective determinant of that of Soviet-Turkish relations.
In other words when relations between the United States and
Turkey have been markedly cordial, Turkey has generally
deemed it imprudent and unnecessary to seek improved rela-
tions with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has been
careful to avoid appearing overly eager to woo Turkey
during such periods. Yet the Soviets have been acutely
sensitive to periodic strains in the American-Turkish
relationship. In the aftermath of such strained periods,
the Soviets have most skillfully encouraged and cultivated
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the mild overtures to the East which Turkey has undertaken,
inspired by an impulse to demonstrate a more independent
and noncommittal foreign policy, and by feelings of
resentment at what she has considered ill treatment by the
United States.
Two such cyclical variations in American-Turkish
and Soviet-Turkish relations can be traced from the
aftermaths of the Cyprus crises of 1964 and 1974.
Signs that American-Turkish relations were not what
they had been throughout the 1950 ' s appeared as early as
the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Despite the strenous
M If
denials of Turkish Prime Minister Inonu, many Turks
believed that President Kennedy had bartered away the
Jupiter missiles stationed in Turkey without consulting the
Turkish government, in exchange for removal of the Soviet
missiles from Cuba. The mild mistrust of the United States
evoked by that incident paled in comparison to the feelings
aroused in Turkey against the United States during the
Cyprus crisis of 1964.
Frequent intercommunal armed clashes between
Cypriot Greeks and Cypriot Turks had broken out on Cyprus
late in 1963, and Turkey was considering armed intervention
to aid the Turkish minority. Ankara feared that the much
larger Greek community would completely subdue the Turkish
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minority, and that a union of Cyprus with Greece (enosis)
would pose a security threat to Turkey's South.
[Ref. 52: pp. 776]
Anxious to prevent a war between two NATO allies -
Greece and Turkey - and unsure of Soviet action in such
circumstances under the mercurial Khrushchev, President
Lyndon B. Johnson issued a strong warning in the form of a
II It
personal letter to Prime Minister Inonu in June 1964 to not
intervene in Cyprus . Although the letter did cause the
Turks to reconsider and ultimately to cancel their planned
invasion, it had a profoundly adverse effect on relations
between the two countries. Now referred to by most Turks
as the infamous "Johnson letter," its most troubling portion
from the Turkish perspective was contained in one sentence,
"I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not
had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to
protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a
step which results in Soviet intervention without the full
consent and understanding of its NATO allies."
[Ref. 55 : pp . 145 ]
Stripped of its diplomatic understatement, that
sentence implied decoupling of the American NATO commitment
to Turkey if the Soviet Union were provoked into military
action against her by Turkish intervention in Cyprus.
Two of the Johnson letter's most significant
results were a dramatic surge in anti-Americanism among
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the deeply offended Turks, and a conscious decision on the
part of the Inonii government to attempt a mild rapproche-
ment with the Soviet Union.
The Soviets were likely somewhat surprised at the
initial Turkish overtures, which included visits to Moscow
in 1964 by Turkish parliamentarians, and by Foreign Minister
Feridun Erkin in October-November 1964, the first such
visit since 1939. As noted in chapter two, Khrushchev had
taken a tough stance against Turkey during the Cyprus
crisis in hopes of dissuading her from intervention and from
causing absorption of Cyprus into the NATO alliance. And
his benignly worded overtures to Turkey for "normalization"
of Soviet-Turkish relations had heretofore fallen on deaf
ears .
Nevertheless, the Soviets - now under new leadership
quickly adjusted to this apparent shift in Turkish policy,
and reciprocated with visits by several high-ranking
officials to Turkey: Presidium member Nikolai Podgorny
in January 1965, and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in
May 1965. [Ref. 52: pp. "79] The visit by Premier Alexei
Kosygin to Turkey in December 1966, the first by a Soviet
premier since Turkey's founding as a republic in 1923,
underscored the importance with which the Soviets viewed
changing their image among the wary Turks.
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Typically, Soviet commentary on this early and
rather tentative improvement in relations with Turkey was
characterized by pugnacious allusions to Turkey's Western
allies, and by a generally self-righteous tone:
The early 1960 's marked a turning point in Soviet-
Turkish political relations, which acquired a new
character and entered a new period. The Soviet
Union has always sought to establish friendly good
neighborly relations with Turkey. At that time
Ankara also set about overcoming the results of the
past policies, the cold war prejudicies and the
covert and, sometimes, direct opposition of certain
domestic and foreign forces that were eager to turn
the fact that the two countries belonged to
different military political alliances to their own
advantage. [Ref. 54: pp. 75]
Perhaps in recognition of Turkey's greater strategic
significance in comparison to Greece, and because of a
growing sense that the Cyprus issue could be subtly played to
Soviet advantage, Foreign Minister Gromyko endorsed a
federated solution in 1965 similar to that long advocated by
the Turks. Greece protested, as Gromyko 's statement
reflected an apparent reversal of prior Soviet support for
Archbishop Makarios ' attempt to merge the island politically
with Greece.
Turkish disenchantment with the United States
because of the Johnson letter and a growing Turkish desire
to strike a more noncommittal stance between the two super-
powers were likewise reflected in the Turkish decision to
withdraw support for the Multilateral Force (MLF) in
January 1965 (during the Podgorny visit) , and in the
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refusal of the Demiral government in 1966 to dispatch
Turkish troops to Vietnam at the reported request of U.S.
Under Secretary of Defense McNaughton. [Ref. 52: pp. 780]
A particularly important dimension of this early
Soviet-Turkish rapprochement was the economic one, which
will be addressed in a later section.
3 . Diplomatic and Political Trends Since the 1970 's
Soviet objectives vis-a-vis Turkey during the period
of Soviet-Turkish rapprochement in the 1960's appear to have
been: (a) to encourage Turkish perceptions of growing
Soviet respectability and international restraint, and
(b) to subtly widen the fissures appearing in American-
Turkish relations. Those objectives and the foreign policy
emanating from them continued during the next decade as
well. The Chechoslovakian crisis of 1968 caused a minor set
back when, following the Soviet invasion of that country,
the Turkish government postponed the visit to the Soviet
Union of Senate President Atasagun. [Ref. 49: pp. 53]
Nevertheless, the improvement in Soviet-Turkish relations was
accruing a momentum of its own which could easily overcome
the slight distraction of socialist "fraternal assistance" -
in the form of tanks and troops - to one of the Soviet
dominions in Eastern Europe.
In the early 1970 's a gradual improvement in
relations with the Soviet Union seemed, furthermore, a
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reasonable policy to Turkey's two principal political
it
parties: the Justice Party (JP) under Suleyman Demirel -
generally conservative in orientation - and the Republican
tl
People's Party (RPP) led by Bulent Ecevit, a movement
comparable to West European social democracy. Three chief
factors appear to have been behind the surprising level of
bipartisan agreement on continuing Turkey's mild form of
Ostpolitik. First, the Turkish political elite was
influenced to a considerable degree by anxiety, lest Turkey
be left behind by the general trend of East-West detente.
Second, constant Soviet declarations of "friendship" and
wishes for "good-neighborly relations" with Turkey, though
always somewhat suspect among the Russophobe Turks, were
being purveyed in the absence of East-West conflict and
against the backdrop of growing Soviet economic assistance
to Turkey. And, third, the Turkish political elite had a
growing sense that the United States, still mired in
Vietnam and moving towards a rapprochement of its own with
the Soviet Union, might in the future prove to be a less
reliable and concerned ally; unpleasant memories of the
Johnson letter were still quite vivid.
The Soviets were thus in an ideal position to
benefit from the emerging respectability in Turkey of seeking
accommodation with the Soviet Union, which was graphically
demonstrated by Turkish willingness to enter into a
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Declaration of Principles of Good Neighborliness with the
Soviet Union on April 17, 1972. [Ref. 47: pp. 17]
Although short on specifics, the document's importance
should not be underestimated. (Please refer to Appendix
A for the text.) First, the Soviets have always attached
great importance to codifying their arrangements and
relations with other countries. Countries which enter into
such arrangements, it is hoped by Moscow, will subsequently
take greater note of Soviet inclinations on important
policy matters. By the same token, such countries can
always be later remonstrated in pious Soviet commentaries
alleging violations of the agreement, if the policies
implemented by them are not to Moscow's liking. Second,
as Michael Binyon has noted, the words "Good neighborliness"
constitute "high praise in the Soviet official vocabulary:"
[Ref. 55] they denote satisfaction with trends in Soviet
relations with countries allegedly displaying that quality,
and they signify hopes for additional Soviet gains.
During the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Turkey
(in coincidental emulation of her rival Greece) did not
challenge Soviet use of Turkish airspace to resupply Egypt
and Syria, yet she refused to allow the United States




airlift to Israel. [Ref. 46: pp. 372] The Turkish position
seems to have stemmed more from an appraisal of Turkey's
developing ties with the Arab world than it did from a
conscious policy choice to conform to Soviet wishes. In
the context of the superpower rivalry, however, Turkey had
acted in a way which benefited Moscow and inconvenienced
Washington; both capitals recognized the significance of
Turkey's choice.
Less than a year later, Turkey and Greece found
themselves at odds again over Cyprus. The ill-fated coup
d ' etat against the government of Archbishop Makarios which
occurred on July 15, 1974 had been led by the ex-EOKA-B
Greek Cypriot terrorist Nicos Sampson. Ankara viewed this
as a perilous development for the Cypriot Turkish minority.
Despite the frantic efforts of American and British
diplomacy to resolve the crisis peacefully, Turkey invaded
the Northern part of the island in force on July 20, 1974.
The remaining chronology of those distressing events has
been well-documented elsewhere and will not be presented
here. Its significance for this discussion is to be
7
Uwe Nerlich has informed the author that the Turks
did not challenge the Soviet claim that their resupply
planes were civilian cargo planes.
o
See especially: Stanley Karnow, "America's Medi-
terranean Bungle." The Atlantic , CCXXXV, 2, (February 1975)
and Laurence Stern, "Bitter Lessons: How We Failed in
Cyprus," Foreign Policy
,
XIX, (Summer 1975), for detailed
(though somewhat opinionated) accounts.
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found in the more notable American and Soviet reactions
in the aftermath of the crisis.
The most visible and important U.S. action was the
Congressional suspension of all military aid and sales to
Turkey effective February 5, 1975. Adopted over the
objections of President Ford, the embargo was allegedly
inspired by prima facie evidence that the Turks had used
American-supplied weapons in violation of the agreements
under which they had been provided. Other observers, not
all of whom were Turks, suggested that the embargo was the
result of the so-called "Greek lobby's" successful effort
to instill in Congressional and American public opinion a
decidely negative impression of Turkey and a favorable one
of Greece.
The embargo was in effect (despite a partial
lifting in October 1975) until August 4, 1978. It proved
to be a singular watershed in U.S. -Turkish relations, for
it added indisputable substance to the belief of many
Turkish policy makers that Turkey could no longer
exclusively rely on the West (as symbolized by the U.S. and
NATO) for its national security, but would have to seek a
modus vivendi with not only the Soviet Union but also with
its Balkan and Middle Eastern neighbors. Thus, to a very
significant degree the arms embargo can be viewed as the
1975 iteration of the Johnson letter of 1964, for it became
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an additional and powerful source of Turkish disillusionment
with the United States, and to a considerable degree, with
the North Atlantic Alliance as well.
The Soviet reaction to the Cyprus crisis of 1974 was
more evenhanded and far less bellicose in tone than that
carried out by Khrushchev a decade earlier. As discussed
at some length in chapter two, the Soviets by 1974 were
attempting to use the Cyprus issue to their advantage by
(a) treading a narrow path between the Greek and Turkish
positions and by (b) attempting to generate anti-NATO (and
thereby anti-U.S.) sentiment in both countries through a
constant drumbeat of heavy-handed rhetoric which assigned
blame for the crisis to American and or "NATO circles."
The journal World Marxist Review has often served
as a forum for Soviet-orchestrated characterizations of
NATO's "ominous" objectives for Cyprus:
The U.S. imperialists and the NATO countries'
ruling circles seek to sabotage the international
detente and provoke and whip up the arms race.
By means of the NATO bloc they seek to involve
Turkey in their adventurist policy. Fanning the
strife between the two communities in Cyprus,
Washington has been stepping up tensions in the
area. The purpose of the policy pursued by
Washington and its allies is to provoke the
ruling circles of Turkey and Greece into taking
reckless action aimed at partitioning Cyprus and
turning it into a NATO base. [Ref. 56: pp. 41]
However, this observer largely shares the views of
John C. Campbell in discussing the 1974 crisis:
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. . . Moscow's declared policy was at times loud,
but its conduct was cautious. The USSR said little
about Turkish aggression and made no move to supply
arms to the Republic of Cyprus. Soviet leaders knew
that they could not really affect what was done about
Cyprus, but that was not so important to them. The
Western powers could not settle the problem, and the
result was to keep Greece and Turkey at loggerheads.
[Ref. 13: pp. 13]
Taking due note of the deep disappointment Turkey
felt with the United States because of the arms embargo,
and perhaps judging that the ever security-conscious Turks
might soon consider new sources of armaments, Moscow carried
out an effort to enhance military relations with Turkey
between 1976 and 1973. Turkey was but one of two Western
countries (the other was Greece) invited to observe the
"Kavkaz" military maneuvers which took place in the Georgian
and Armenian Union Republics in January 1976. [Ref. 57:
pp. 204] Close on the heels of "Kavkaz," the Deputy Chief
of Staff of the Turkish Army Kenan Evren, who has since
become the Turkish head of state in the military government
which assumed power in September 1980, toured Soviet
installations in the Moscow, Leningrad, and Volgograd
Military Districts. [Ref. 42: pp. 617]
On July 18, 1976, less than two months after
General Evren's visit, the new Soviet naval vessel Kiev
passed through the Turkish Straits from the Black Sea into
the Mediterranean. Although the Kiev is configured to
carry 30-36 "Yak" vertical/short take-off and landing
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(V/STOL) jet aircraft, the Soviets classify the ship as an
"anti-submarine strike cruiser" rather than as an aircraft
carrier. Turkey declined to challenge that designation
and therefore saw no breach of the Montreux Convention,
which bans the passage of aircraft carriers under any
circumstance
.
Coming as it did at the height of Turkish distress
over the American reaction to the 1974 Cyprus crisis, the
Turkish decision to not challenge passage of the Kiev may
have been designed to: (a) signal Turkey's displeasure at
the American arms embargo to the United States; and (b)
convey to the Soviet Union a tacit message of Turkish
readiness to be more accommodating about Soviet interests.
The Turkish position on the Kiev may have
strengthened Soviet hopes of capitalizing on Turkey's growing
estrangement from the West. Soviet Chief of Staff Marshal
Ogarkov was sent to Turkey in April 1978 to demonstrate,
among other things, Soviet seriousness about establishing
some sort of Soviet-Turkish military linkage. Accompanied
by Soviet officers of unusually high rank - Air Marshal
Yefimov, Admiral Amelko, General Zotov, and General Borisov -
the visit coincided with the committee level debate in the
U.S. Congress of a motion to lift the three-year ban on
arms supplies to Turkey. [Ref. 58] While in Turkey,
Marshal Ogarkov commented on the trip to the Soviet Union
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planned by then-Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit for
June 19"8, declaring that the visit would be "a strong and
important factor for the improvement of Turkish-Soviet
relations. When I say relations ... I mean military
relations as well." [Ref. 59] Upon the completion of
Marshal Ogarkov's visit, the Turkish Defense Minister Hasan
Esat Isik said that the Soviet Union had informed Turkey
that it would examine the means at its disposal for supplying
Turkey with arms, should a request be made by Ankara.
[Ref. 60] Although, as near as can be determined, no such
request was forwarded by the Turks, the evidence strongly
suggests that had the American arms embargo not been lifted,
the Soviets would have willingly assumed the role of chief
arms supplier to Turkey.
The height of Soviet-Turkish political rapproachement
in the post-war era likely occurred during the period
bracketing Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit' s trip to the Soviet
Union in 1978. In an interview with The New York Times just
before the visit, Ecevit revealed that he planned to sign a
political document in Moscow that would stress the
"friendship" between the two countries. [Ref. 61] Turkey,
he said, felt "no threat" from Russia and there had been "no
indications in recent years of Soviet ambitions on Turkey or
Soviet intent to interfere in Turkey." [Ref. 61] It is
interesting to note, in retrospect, the striking similarities
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between Ecevit's views on East-West relations and those more
recently expressed by leftist Andreas Papandreou, the current
Prime Minister of Greece. (Please see chapter two, for
samples of those views.) Both statesmen seem to share
comparably benign attitides toward the Soviet Union and
somewhat skeptical views of the United States. The policies
of Prime Minister Papandreou of Greece should, perhaps,
therefore be observed carefully for signs of a shift to the
East such as that carried out by Ecevit in Turkey some four
years ago.
During Ecevit's trip to the Soviet Union in June 1978,
Turkey and the Soviet Union signed the Political Document on
the Principles of Good Neighborly and Friendly Co-operation.
The June 23 agreement bound the two countries to develop
good-neighborly relations and cooperation "on the basis of
respect for one another's sovereignty, equality, way of
life, public order and territorial integrity, non-
interference in internal affairs, mutual security, and
mutual benefit." [Ref. 62] (Please see Appendix B for the
text.) Although the accord fell short of a non-aggression
pact, significantly it called on both parties to "observe
fully . . . refraining from the use of or threat of force,
and also of refraining from the granting of their territory
for the carrying out of aggression and subversive actions
against other states." [Ref. 63] Obviously, a narrow
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interpretation of that particular provision would not only
very likely cause a suspension in U.S. surveillance
activity of the USSR from Turkish territory, but would
probably also preclude use of Turkish bases for contingency
staging of Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) assets
prior to their employment in an acute Middle Eastern or
Persian Gulf crisis.
Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin, at a state dinner
given in honor of Prime Minister Ecevit, deftly outlined
Soviet hopes for enhancing ties with Turkey as a result of
the Political Document:
The agreed-upon draft of the political document on
the principles of good-neighborly and friendly
co-operation between the Soviet Union and the Turkish
Republic opens up new possibilities
,
in the light
of this, for co-operation between our countries both
in the field of bilateral relations and in the
international scene . [Ref . 64]
No less tactful, but perhaps more candid expressions
of Soviet satisfaction with Turkish entry into the accord
appeared in the Soviet journal International Affiars :
. . . the Political Document does not only follow
in the footsteps of the Declaration of 1972 but
enriches and develops it in keeping with the latest
tendencies in the world and in Soviet-Turkish
relations, raising them to a new level.
The negotiations in Moscow showed in fact that
Soviet-Turkish relations are independent of the
parties' relations with other countries and . . .
that Turkey, while giving priority to its own
national requirements and adopting a sober approach
to the existing realities
,
is persistently seeking
ways of ensuring its genuine security, reassessing
to this end the foreign political concepts of the
cold war period. [Ref. 54: pp. 76]
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And, following the signing of the pact, Ecevit
revealed the extent to which he judged Turkey to now be
on good terms with the Soviet Union when he declared that
the Soviet leadership had acted "in consciousness of the
fact that though we are close friends
,
we are both members
of different alliances." [Ref. 62]
Thus, the signing of the Political Document was an
extraordinarily important development in Soviet-Turkish
relations and in the history of the North Atlantic Alliance.
First, it reflected the depth of profound resentment and
disappointment Turkey felt for the United States, and for
NATO as a collective Western entity, which had their origins
in American miscalculation of Turkish sensitivities during
the 1964 Cyprus crisis and in the aftermath of the 1974
Cyprus crisis. Second, it graphically demonstrated the
extent to which the Soviets had been able to temper the
historically Russophobe Turks' mistrust of the Soviet Union
through patient, careful diplomacy and restrained inter-
national conduct. Third, and of great concern for NATO (one
hopes) is the apparent conflict between the provision of the
pact prohibiting Turkey from granting "territory for the
carrying out of aggression and subversive actions ..."
and Turkish adherence to Articles Three (dealing with
collective capacity, joint action, etc. . .) and Eight
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(prohibiting entry into commitments which may conflict
with the NATO Treaty) of the North Atlantic Alliance.
Signs of a closer Soviet-Turkish relationship
soon followed. In November 1978, some five months after
the Soviet-Turkish accord was signed, two Soviet warships
arrived in Istanbul for the first naval courtesy visit to
Turkey in almost 40 years. [Ref. 65] Highlighting the
importance of the visit was the fact that the Commander in
Chief of the Soviet Union's Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral
Nikolai I. Khovrin was embarked on one of the ships - the
cruiser Dzerzhinsky. [Ref. 65] This was reciprocated by
the visit of two Turkish destroyers under the command of
Vide Admiral Toktamis , to the Black Sea port of Odessa
in December 1978
.
Prime Minister Ecevit's declaration in 1979 that
Soviet permission would have to be secured in advance of
American U-2 flights over Turkey for SALT II verification
purposes, also suggested that Soviet sensitivities would
play an increasingly important role in the desiderata of
Turkish national security policy formulation. The flights
were considered by the United States after the loss of two
electronic listening posts in Iran earlier that year.
[Ref. 66] A high-ranking Soviet official said in May 1979
that Moscow, not surprisingly, would "receive positively
any Turkish decision not to allow the U-2 flights." [Ref. 66]
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Although by that time the American arms embargo had been
lifted for almost a year, American-Turkish relations were
still strained by Congressional refusal to approve a
sizeable military aid commitment to Ankara. [Ref. 42:
pp. 650]
On the other hand, Prime Minister Ecevit did permit
the reopening in late 1978 of four U.S. intelligence-
monitoring installations in Turkey when the arms embargo was
officially lifted - notwithstanding the June 1978 Soviet-
Turkish Political Document. An extremely shrewd politician.
Ecevit seems to have been confident of his ability to discern
which Turkish actions could be expected to provoke Soviet
anger and which might evoke Soviet displeasure - U-2 flights
presumably having the former characteristic.
Soviet unhappiness with Turkey's willingness to
continue close military relations with the United States was
subsequently expressed by a Soviet political commentator in
July 1980:
. . . the U.S. administration is using the Afghan
and Iranian events as a pretext for stepping up
aggressive military preparations in the Middle East,
including Turkey. It is from these positions that
one should view the new U.S. -Turkish military
agreement that was signed in late March this year
and which boils down to the retention of U.S.
military bases with U.S. military personnel on
Turkish territory. It is no secret to anyone that
these bases are aimed, first and foremost, against
the Soviet Union and Turkey's other neighbors.
[Ref. 67: pp. 120]
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The same author was not bashful about providing a
candid Soviet prescription for a more "realistic" Turkish
approach to Soviet-Turkish relations:
Realistically-minded people in Turkey, regardless
of their social status, are well aware that the
course toward detente, toward strengthening and
developing good-neighborly relations with the
Soviet Union, and not toward confrontation with
its northern neighbor, is best suited to their
country's national interests . [Ref. 67: pp. 120]
The accession to power in Ankara of a military regime
led by Army Chief of Staff General Kenan Evren on
September 12, 1980 was quite likely viewed as a negative
development by the Soviets. Several reasons for such a
judgement can be cited. First, the Turkish military made no
secret of its pro-NATO orientation and preference for
American military equipment over Soviet arms. Second, both
the previous post-World War II military regimes which
briefly held power in Turkey had suppressed leftist
political activities; probably the Soviets felt this one
would do so as well - and it has. Third, the military coup
may have been an unintended by-product of indirect Soviet
efforts to destabilize the Turkish body politic.
Suspicions had been deepening among many well-informed Turks
that the Soviet Union was providing covert support to many
of the leftists elements responsible for the chronic
political violence and terrorism that dominated Turkish life





Economic Relations and Trends Since the 1960 's
Economic agreement, focusing on aid, industrial
construction projects, and loans comprised a major
component of the Soviet-Turkish rapprochement which started
in the mid-1960 's. Spurred by the eight-day visit of
Soviet Premier Kosygin to Turkey in late December 1966, a
Soviet-Turkish economic agreement was effected in March 1967
in which the Soviet Union pledged to help finance six
indistrial projects: an aluminum factory at Seydisehir, an
oil refinery near Izmir, a sulphuric acid factory at
Bandirma, the Seyit Omer transmission line, an iron and steel
factory at Iskenderun, and a fiber-sheet factory at Artvin.
[Ref. 68: pp. 52] Between 1967 and 1975 Soviet loans to
Turkey totalled nearly $700 million.
During Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit's watershed
visit to Moscow in June 1978, significant agreements were
reached in the economic as well as political spheres. The
two countries signed agreements which resulted in: (a)
Soviet pledges to sell Turkey three million tons of crude
oil a year starting in 1979 (payment to be made in Turkish
wheat) ; (b) a three-year trade accord which envisioned
increasing the Soviet-Turkish commercial exchange by 250
percent per year; and (c) a Soviet offer to provide




A year later, an even more elaborate economic
arrangement was concluded. The June 5, 1979 accord called
for the Soviets to build a nuclear power plant in Turkey,
to guarantee fuel supplies for its operation and to
provide financing for one half of the reactor's cost.
[Ref. 70] An additional $400 million in project credits
were promised by the Soviets for a doubling of the
Iskenderlin iron and steel complex to an annual capacity of
2 billion tons, and for the building of a new hydrogen
peroxide plant and thermal plant. The agreement also called
for an increase in Soviet electricity supplies to Turkey's
Eastern and Black Sea provinces to 2.4 billion KWH a year,
by means of erecting an additional power transmission line
between the two countries. [Ref. 70]
The politically ambivalent nature of Soviet-
Turkish economic agreements has aroused little interest in
NATO circles, particularly as such agreements could be
construed, until recently, as occurring in the general
context of East-West detente, and against the backdrop of
even more substantial economic exchanges between the Soviet
Union and certain West European governments, especially West
Germany. Additionally, perhaps some Western observers were
glad to see any government besides their own, profferring
assistance to the feeble Turkish economy.
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Turkey has sought closer economic ties with the
Soviet Union principally for three main purposes: (a) to
obtain large capital loans on liberal terms for heavy
industrial projects; (b) to expand her volume of foreign
trade; and (c) to obtain an additional source of critical
fuel and electricity. In light of her economic circum-
stances in the late 1970' s, which were characterized by
rampant inflation and a weak balance of payments position,
Turkey's willingness to accept aid from whatever source can
be understood. Soviet terms were generous, and the Soviets
wisely did not openly make Turkish political concessions
part of the price for Soviet assistance.
Nevertheless, Soviet motives for offering economic
packages of such impressive magnitude to the Turks were
probably inspired by more than hopes of accruing Turkish
friendship. If Turkey could be made gradually dependent on
continued Soviet assistance and somewhat reliant on imports
of Soviet oil and electricity, then it would not be
unreasonable to expect Turkey to hesitate before opposing
Soviet interests on key issues of political or military
concern. Furthermore, displays of economic generosity and
largesse were fully in keeping with Soviet efforts to





Premier Alexei Kosygin candidly expressed the Soviet
view of the benefits stemming from improved economic
relations between his country and Turkey, during the state
banquet given in honor of Prime Minister Ecevit in 1978:
. . . political relations usually become stronger and
more stable with the expansion of practical, business
ties and contacts and, in their turn, exert a
stimulating influence on the course of economic and
other co-operation between states. [Ref. 64]
Turkey, of course, had and still has legitimate
economic concerns and difficulties which lead her to seek
such assistance with less concern for its source than for
its nature and the generosity of relevant terms.
Even the conservative military government which
came to power in Ankara in September 1980 has exchanged trade
and industry delegations with the Soviets, despite its
conscious cooling of other Turkish ties with the USSR.
[Ref. 71] Thus, in March 1981, the Soviet Union agreed to
provide Turkey $200 million in credits, repayable over ten
years at five percent annual interest, to help pay for an
expansion program at the Seydisehir aluminum smelter.
[Ref. 72] The agreement followed a three-day visit to
Turkey by the chairman of the Soviet state committee for
foreign economic relations, Semyon Skachkov, leading a





Soviet Links to Turkish Terrorism: A Twisted Trail
There has been much speculation among Western
analysts about Soviet involvement in the political violence
which gripped Turkey from 1976 until just recently. The
evidence available in open sources tends to be circumstantial
and indirect, but also suggestive of a major Soviet role in
sponsoring such violence.
Politically related killings in Turkey became a
major problem in 1976 when 104 such deaths were reported.
[Ref. 73: pp. 36] The level of violence increased
dramatically during the 1978-1979 period, while more than
300 killings occurred in the first five months of 1980
alone. [Ref. 74]
According to George S. Harris, there were three
somewhat distinct patterns to the violence. First, a large
number of deaths resulted from sociological causes such as
the importation of ethnic or religious feuds from the
countryside to the rapidly growing Turkish cities of the
late 1970' s. Second, violent clashes between members of
opposing political factions accounted for a substantial
portion of the unrest - particularly during commemorative
occasions (such as May Day rallies). Well-organized
leftist groups appear to have initiated this aspect of the
upheaval, and the rightists soon reciprocated in kind,
starting a seemingly never-ending cycle of attack and
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reprisal. Attacks against security forces in Turkey's
unstable East, frequently carried out by leftist groups
advocating autonomy rule for Kurdish peoples, comprised the
third pattern of the violence. [Ref. 73: pp. 37-38]
The latter two patterns of political violence have
been associated primarily with the Soviet Union. Evidence
unearthed thus far by Turkish officials has revealed two
dimensions of support for the violence in which Soviet
sponsorship was probable - arms and funding - and one in
which Soviet sponsorship was certain - propaganda.
When Turkey's military government started strictly
enforcing martial law in late 1980, it launched a vigorous
campaign to confiscate illegally acquired firearms. By
October 1981 the government had seized more than 730,000
weapons. [Ref. "5] Most of those are believed to have
entered Turkey through what Turkish journalist Oktay Eski
satirically called "our good neighbor policy " in allusion
to shipments by truck across the Bulgarian frontier and to
large-scale smuggling across a "wide-open Syrian frontier."
[Ref. 76] Neither Bulgaria nor Syria appear to have had
the political incentive or wherewithal to have effected the
massive gun running which took place, and clearly both




Turkish security officials estimated the cost of
carrying out the terrorism in Turkey between 1978 and 1981
to be approximately $1 billion. According to Admiral Isik
Beren, who ordered a study done of terrorist bank
robberies in Turkey during the past three years:
The money taken during all these robberies adds up
to no more than 2 percent of the real cost of
terrorism during the period. We were surprised to
find that bank robberies netted the terrorists so
little. Links between terrorism and drug trafficking
are being uncovered, but this is not credible as the
major source of funds. [Ref. 77]
In view of the foregoing circumstances, most Turkish
officials have concluded that the political terrorism was
supported as part of a covert destabilization scheme
underwritten by the Soviet Union. [Ref. 77] One cabinet
minister in Suleyman Demirel's pre-coup government of 1979-
1980 even went so far as to assert that the Soviets had
aspirations to capture the country "from inside." [Ref. 78]
In fact, of the likely sources of outside support, only the
Soviet Union would seem to have had the resources
,
organizational competence, and experience to have manipulated
such a program of profound destabilization. According to
Soviet KGB defector Victor Sakharov, the KGB's VIII depart-
ment had the objective of mounting a "brutal campaign of
urban terrorism, kidnapping, and assassination against
Turkey." [Ref. 79: pp. 234]
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Remarks made by the Tass correspondent in Turkey,
Aleksiyev Erocenkov, to the German magazine Stern in
January 1980 may have inadvertently hinted at the Soviet
role in promoting political instability. Erocenkov had
said Turkey would be turned into a socialist state.
[Ref. 76] Shortly thereafter Turkey requested that he
depart Turkey because he had been "involved with Turkish
internal affairs." [Ref. 80]
With regard to the role of Soviet-inspired
propaganda in promoting turmoil in Turkey, this observer
agrees to a large extent with Paul B. Henze's observation
that:
. . . there is one solid body of evidence that
cannot be contradicted: the two Soviet- supported
radio stations broadcasting to Turkey from Eastern
Europe. "Bizim Radyo" (Our Radio) and the Voice of
the Turkish Communist Party have encouraged
extremism in the same way the Baku-based National
Voice of Iran fomented unrest in that country.
[Ref. 77]
Paralleling the broadcast campaigns during the increasing
unrest of the late 1970 's, the emigre Turkish Communist
Party (TCP) kept up a constant drumbeat of Marxist
exhortation in Soviet-sponsored publications encouraging
leftist participation in the unrest:
The Turkish people are mounting an active
struggle for their vital interests. Here are some
of the most important mass actions of the past
several years: the May Day demonstrations and
rallies in 1976, 1977, and 1978, the 1976 general
strike with the demand to eliminate the State
Security Courts, the eight-month long strike by
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metal workers against local and foreign monopolies
in 1977 and 1978, and the general strike against
the fascist terror in March last year
. . .
Alongside the anti- imperialist and anti-
fascist slogans, the working people put forward
this demand: 'Freedom for the CPT ! ' All of this
is the result of the Turkish communists' well-
considered and painstaking preparatory work with
the use of legal and illegal methods
. [Ref. 56:
PP- 37]
Likewise, promoting unrest among the Kurdish peoples of
Eastern Turkey was evidently a particularly important
objective for the TCP:
Class battles are becoming increasingly acute in
the Kurdish areas. The Kurdish peasants are step-
ping up their struggle against survivals of
feudalism and the landowners. The mounting
national movement of the Kurds is acquiring a
distinct social hue. By resisting national
oppression and discrimination the Kurds are
contributing to the fight against enemy number one
of the whole Turkish people, namely international
imperialism and the Turkish monopoly bourgeoisie
cooperating with it. [Ref. 81: pp. 14]
•
On balance, Soviet support of the Turkish political
unrest can be said to have probably encompassed indirect
funding and arming of violent factions, and to certainly
have included a Soviet-encouraged propaganda campaign to
foment turmoil.
Nevertheless, two vexing questions are raised by
these judgments. First, why would the Soviets have
provided substantial support and encouragement to movements
whose goals were the downfall of Turkish regimes with which
the USSR had painstakingly improved relations - regimes which,
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moreover, often apparently assigned weight to Soviet foreign
policy concerns and interests before acting? Second, when
it became grossly apparent to knowledgeable observers of the
Turkish political scene in 1979 and in 1980 that the
Turkish military was becoming increasingly discontented
with the paralysis of civilian governments in the face of
chronic political unrest, why would the Soviets have
persisted in supporting actions which surely would invite
a military accession to power?
The following supposition may provide a partial
answer: Soviet policy towards Turkey could well have been
derived from two or more competitive and powerful
bureaucratic claimants for the responsibility for its
formulation. One claimant, presumably the Foreign
Ministry, may have been urging continued improvement of
state to state relations as the best way to achieve Soviet
aims in Turkey. A rival claimant, probably the KGB, may
have insisted on pursuing an aggressive effort of political
destabilization as a means of attaining a faster and more
complete pay-off. The resulting bureaucratic compromise
consequently retained strands of both claimants' wishes.
If this analysis is accurate, then it suggests that
domestic bureaucratic considerations in the USSR may well
have contributed to a Soviet foreign policy failure of some
magnitude, by fostering circumstances which brought to power
in Turkey a decidedly conservative military government.
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D. A SUMMING UP: SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS TURKEY
Analysis of Soviet policies toward Turkey since World
War II suggests that a defining characteristic of Soviet
perceptions of Turkey has been an abiding appreciation of her
essential strategic worth as simultanously the possessor
of the Dardanelles and Bosphorous, and as a rugged land
barrier separating the Soviet Union from Iraq, Syria,
Lebanon and points south. That appreciation has translated
into a program of Soviet efforts to shift Turkish alignment
with the West to a closer and more accommodative affiliation
with the Soviet Union.
Under Stalin, the Soviets hoped to gain by intimidation
and ultimatum territorial concessions and revisions to
the Montreux Convention which would have been decisively
favorable to the USSR. Stalin's brusque probing proved
extremely counterproductive to Soviet interests; for it
helped lead to the Truman Doctrine, and inspired the Turks
to seek permanent security arrangements with the West.
Soviet-Turkish relations reached a turning point in
1965 in the aftermath of the first major post-war strain
in the American-Turkish relationship. It was during that
period that the essential outline of modern Soviet approaches
to Turkey came to be distinguished by the following
features: (a) diplomatic and political efforts to improve
Soviet-Turkish state relations and to cultivate an image of
90

credibility and "good neighborliness ;" (b) a readiness to
offer financial assistance and trade considerations on the
most favorable terms; and (c) a wary alertness for signs
of tension in Turkey's relations with the United States,
or with the West, which might be turned to the Soviet
advantage
.
During the mid to late 1960 's the Soviets' restrained
and careful policy towards Turkey brought about a mild
improvement in state- to-state relations, and Turkey acted
somewhat more independently of the United States. But it
was between 1972 and 1979 that the Soviets clearly achieved
notable success in imposing several of their concerns, wishes,
and anxieties onto the framework of Turkish national security
considerations. Carefully mixing patient diplomacy and
attractive economic overtures, the Soviets availed themselves
of the opportunities furnished by East-West detente and the
openings rendered irresistible by the American arms embargo.
The principal examples of Soviet success in inducing some
convergence of Turkish policies and diplomatic behavior with
Soviet objectives can be summarized chronologically as follows
April 1972: Signing of Soviet-Turkish accord entitled
The Declaration of the Principles of
Good Neighborliness
October 1973: Turkish willingness to grant the Soviet
Union overflight rights to resupply
Syria and Egypt during the Yom Kippur





facilities to American aircraft during
that war
.
July 1976: Turkish acceptance of the Soviet
designation of the Kiev as an "anti-
submarine strike cruiser," thereby permit-
ting its passage through the Turkish
Straits
.
Prime Minister Ecevit's declaration that
Turkey felt "no threat" from the Soviet
Union.
Signing of Soviet-Turkish accord entitled
the Political Document on the Principles
of Good Neighborly and Friendly Co-
operation.
June 1979: Turkish denial of permission to United
States to conduct U-2 flights over Turkey
for SALT II verification purposes, unless
Soviet permission obtained in advance.
If the years from 1972 to 1979 may be viewed as a period
in which Soviet influence in Turkey was an upward arching
curve, since the installation of a military government in
Ankara in September 1980 that curve has started to visibly
descend. The perception on the part of Turkey's leadership
that the Soviet Union actively supported political extremists
and terrorists during the volatile 1976-1980 period, has
dampened the Generals' enthusiasm for maintaining a Soviet-
Turkish rapprochement. Trade relations and economic
arrangements may still be sustained, but even in this realm
As noted in an earlier section this decision by Turkey
probably resulted more out of concern for Arab-Turkish
harmony than out of concern for Soviet sensitivities.
However, because the Turkish action resulted in a demonstra-





there are indications that Turkey's economic planners are
unhappy with some of the barter contracts signed with the
Soviets in the 1970's.
The Soviets have taken a somewhat cautious approach
since the military took power. Only recently have there
been signs of criticism in the official Soviet media, such
as that contained in a recent article in Trud, the Soviets'
official trade union newspaper:
Disquieting reports are coming from Turkey. The life
of the leaders and activists [of the main leftist union
groupings] is in danger. [Ref. 82]
Probably the Soviets are hopeful that the military will
eventually step down and be replaced by a civilian poli-
tical regime more responsive to Soviet pressure and concerns
The Soviets, of course, remain keenly alert for signs of
strain in American-Turkish relations and/or increases in
anti-American sentiment; it is a matter of historical record
that such circumstances have tended to cause Turkey to seek
improved relations with the Soviet Union.
In January 1982 American defense sources revealed that
Turkey has asked the United States for permission to
purchase 291 advanced American fighter-bombers - either the
F-16 or the land version of the F-18 [Ref. 85]; the proposed
sale must be approved by the Congress as well as the
administration. If Ankara finds the American reply wanting,
the Kremlin, just as it has done for the past twenty-nine
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years, will patiently and skillfully try to channel Ankara's
disappointment onto paths deemed beneficial to Soviet





IV. A COMPARISON OF SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS GREECE WITH
SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS TURKEY
A. INTRODUCTION: THE GRECO -TURKISH RIVALRY
More than a third of a century has passed since the end
of World War II, and in that relatively brief span Greece
and Turkey have been on the brink of open warfare three
times. Twice, in fact, they have committed elements of
their regular armed forces to directly support their respec-
tive proxies in Cyprus. Potentially more serious
contentions have been raised owing to conflicting claims of
sovereignty in the Aegean Sea, where underground oil deposits
are suspected. Because of recent political change in Greece,
arbitration of these disputes has become less likely.
Unless both parties can be encouraged to resolve their
differences through patient, albeit frustrating diplomacy,
the West ought not to be surprised by an outbreak of
hostilities, relatively soon, over the acrimonious Aegean
Sea disputes.
This is not a very original state of affairs; the Greco-
Turkish rivalry is one of the oldest and most notorious in
the West. Divided by religion and language, and by memories
of old grudges and slights, the two countries nevertheless
share a wide range of cultural and sociological affinities.
In fact, it is hard not to conceive of Greece without also

thinking of Turkey and vice versa. Talk to a Greek and
invariably, even involuntarily, the subject will gradually
shift to Turkey, or to Greco-Turkish disputes, or to Cyprus.
Talk to a Turk and the same process will transpire, though
in reverse.
An appreciation of the foregoing historical and cultural
dynamic is essential in forging prescriptions for any state's
foreign policy towards either Balkan nation. All states
which presume to conduct diplomatic relations with both
Greece and Turkey find themselves occasionally forced to
pursue a wary balancing act in which their interests in
Greece must be appraised, measured, and even offset by their
interests in Turkey, and vice versa. The more widespread
and significant those interests the greater the caution, it
would seem, with which approaches to both countries have to
be gauged.
The Soviet Union has not been exempt from having to face
the realities of the Ankara-Athens rivalry, particularly
during periods of improving relations with one, or the other,
or with both. The Soviets have not, however, felt
constrained to give the appearance of a relatively impartial
dual-track approach to Greece and Turkey. Since the end of
the Second World War, and particularly since the death of
Stalin, no state has practiced the venerable art of Real -
politik with more sangfroid and with greater shrewdness than
has the Soviet Union in Western Europe. Hence the Soviets
96

have not been reluctant to appear to favor one party over
the other when they thought it more opportune to do so. In
Soviet eyes, Turkey has always been the greater strategic
prize, and Moscow's policies have correspondingly reflected
such an asymmetry.
This chapter compares, contrasts, and notes interactions
of Soviet policy towards Greece and Turkey. The analysis
and evidence contained in preceeding chapters is synthesized
from a broad policy perspective. The concluding section of
the thesis, which follows this chapter, examines Soviet
approaches towards Greece and Turkey in the context of Soviet
policy towards Western Europe.
B. THE TWO CASES COMPARED: RECURRING THEMES IN SOVIET-
GREEK AND SOVIET-TURKISH RELATIONS
Stalin's approaches to Greece and Turkey in the period
following World War II were not tempered by any of the
sophistication which characterized his successors. Soviet
prospects in countries judged to be within the sphere of
potential Soviet influence, were weighed dispassionately,
and in the absence of even superficial regard for those
countries' political preferences.
Given the sequence of Soviet disassociation from the
Greek Communist insurgency in 1946, it seems clear that
Stalin considered a Communist victory there to be of minor
importance in comparison to the perils of Western (U.S.)
opposition that might well arise in such a circumstance.
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Stalin was clearly not concerned about seeking some
sort of balance in his Greek and Turkish policies, nor did
he apparently consider that they should be two sides of the
same coin. From his perspective it was important to make
gains quickly - if they were to be made at all - prior to an
awakening on the part of the West (particularly the
Americans) as to just what the Soviet Union was attempting
to achieve in Central and Southeastern Europe. Because he
judged Turkey to be of great strategic significance and
largely bereft of sympathetic allies, Stalin prodded for
Turkish weaknesses which could be turned to Soviet advantage.
Greece, on the other hand, could count on complete (though
insufficient) British support in her struggle against
Communist insurgency. The Truman Doctrine, announced in
March 1947, of course changed the level of risk Stalin per-
ceived as impinging on his aspirations for Turkey. And it
convinced him of the wisdom of withdrawing even propaganda
support for the Greek Communist rebellion.
Soviet policy towards Greece and Turkey, as practiced
by Stalin, was thus shaped by the immediate post-war
objective of enhancing Soviet security through an expansion
of Moscow's dominions in quarters thought unlikely to provoke
Western challenge. Thus, in looking towards Athens, Stalin
saw not the Greek government, but an image of British and
perhaps American strength which served to underscore his
misgivings about supporting the Communist uprising. And in
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looking towards Ankara, he at first had seen nothing but a
rather isolated Turkish government which he deemed
potentially tractable to forceful Soviet demands.
The accession to NATO by both Greece and Turkey on the
same day (February 18, 1952) probably served notice to
Moscow that resistance to Communist pressures had worked
against Soviet interests by encouraging them to join the
Western Alliance. Once in the alliance Greece and Turkey had
dramatically changed their status from rather weak and
solitary states, potentially susceptible to Soviet duress,
to formal allies of Moscow's principal antagonist, the
United States. Greece and Turkey had voluntarily joined a
grouping of states viewed with considerable suspicion by
Moscow, and whose long-term goals have always been depicted
by the Soviets in the most stark and bellicose phraseology.
Thus Greece and Turkey had become participants in a security
arrangement which seems to have aroused Soviet apprehension
from its inception. Correspondingly, future Soviet policy
towards both nations would have to consider their NATO
membership. No longer could they routinely be judged
candidates for overt Soviet military encroachment, but,
rather, targets for indirect approaches designed to weaken
their allegiance to the West.
With the changes in Soviet leadership after Stalin's
death in 1953, variations in Soviet policy towards Western
Europe (including Greece and Turkey) manifested themselves
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as well. Some of the apparently new Soviet positions may well
have been inevitable, no matter who led the Politburo.
Nevertheless, the dramatic contrast between Stalin's dour and
somewhat outdated Bolshevik world view and Khrushchev's
ebulliently purveyed theme of "peaceful coexistence" caused
such changes as did occur to appear as sharp distinctions.
A Soviet effort to improve state-to-state relations with
many West European governments was one such policy shift
which had implications for Greece and Turkey. Soviet goals,
though always somewhat obscure, very likely included hopes
that Greek and Turkish perceptions of Soviet respectability
would make possible more sympathetic considerations of
Soviet positions and interests.
Starting in 1953, the Soviets began a rather well-
organized campaign to convince Turkey of the prudence of
improving relations with Moscow. As discussed in the
preceeding chapter, this campaign included a Soviet
withdrawal of Stalin's peremptory territorial claims, and
pleas for "normalization" of relations from Khrushchev as
well as from authoritative spokesmen in Soviet sponsored
publications such as International Affairs and Soviet News .
Greece, on the other hand, seemed to command less
attention from the Kremlin than did Turkey. Apart from the
July 23, 1953 announcement that Soviet diplomatic
representation in Greece was to be upgraded to ambassadorial
status from the charge d'affaires level, not much else of
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note could be observed in the evolution of Soviet-Greek
relations during the early 1950 's. Perhaps, then, it was
not coincidental that Khrushchev failed to mention Greece
even once in a December 1955 foreign policy speech before
the Supreme Soviet, while devoting more than 100 words to
10
Soviet-Turkish matters.
Yet, to a significant extent, the differences that
existed in Moscow's approaches to Greece and Turkey during
the 1950's were more differences of degree, and not of policy
orientation. Khrushchev seemed committed to improving the
image of the Soviet Union in both Balkans, as well as
elsewhere, by combining overtures for improved relations with
his now routine theme of peaceful coexistence. That more
attention was apparently being focused an Ankara rather than
on Athens no doubt reflected a less than entirely cynical
appraisal of the relative importance of the two countries,
and of the prospects for Soviet gains in each. This general
Soviet quest to improve relations with Greece and Turkey
became an important and almost monotonously unvarying feature
of Moscow's policies towards these two nations that has
persisted to the present day.
As the 1960 's unfolded, Soviet approaches to Turkey
in particular came to be characterized by an additional
The speech appeared in Pravda on December 30, 1955
and was later reprinted in New Times
,
2, January 5, 1956.
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important feature - the readiness to channel dissatisfaction
with American policy into routes judged beneficial to Moscow's
interests. This particular aspect of Soviet policy did not
become noticeably decipherable in Moscow's approaches to
Greece until the 1970 's simply because American-Greek
relations remained superficially cordial throughout the
1960's.
Khrushchev's successors were quick to respond to the
initially hesitant shift to the east undertaken by Turkish
leaders in the aftermath of several American-Turkish rifts.
Soviet-Turkish relations thus expanded during this period to
include symbolically important visits by the Turkish Foreign
Minister to the USSR and by Soviet Premier Kosygin to Turkey.
Such events were noticeably absent from the Soviet-Greek
scene until well into the 1970's.
Interestingly, Soviet trade initiatives with Greece in
the I960' s yielded some modest gains and seemed to mirror
both in timing and in scope similar initiatives undertaken
with Turkey. One such example of apparent economic duality
occurred in October 1964. On October 8, the Western press
reported that Turkey and the Soviet Union would jointly
build a $15 million dam and irrigation project on the Arpa
River, which forms the frontier between them. [Ref. 84]
Less than a week later, on October 14, 1964, Greece and the
Soviet Union signed a five-year trade agreement which pledged,
among other things, to double the value of their trade by
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1969. [Ref. 85] Though one cannot discount the possibility
of coincidental timing, the essential overlap of the two
events seemed calculated to convey a net impression of
Soviet evenhandedness
.
The seemingly generous and reasonable economic linkages
being proffered by the Soviets also underscored Moscow's
presistent efforts to demonstrate Soviet respectability to
Athens and Ankara, and may have been partially designed to
sow seeds of uncertainty in the heretofore reflexively pro-
American orientation of both capitals. Certainly the Soviets
had fertile ground to work with in Turkey, where national
sensibilities had been deeply offended by President Johnson's
letter during the 1964 Cyprus crisis.
Soviet economic overtures to Greece and Turkey became
more visible in the 1970 's owing to the growing momentum of
detente-encouraged East-West exchanges, and to Moscow's
correct belief that both governments were seeking to become
more independent economic and political actors. Soviet-Greek
relations gradually acquired some of the hues of Soviet-
The Cyprus issue appears to have been an intriguing
intersection of Soviet policy towards Greece with that
towards Turkey. Conceptually, it would appear likely that
the Soviets have been compelled to chose between one side
of the other despite an ingrained Soviet preference for
making very general statements which can be construed as
support for all sides in disputes involving countries with
whom they seek to ingratiate themselves. These issues
should be explored further.
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Turkish relations, although, particularly in the first part
of the decade, it appeared that the former were addressed by
Moscow almost as afterthoughts to more concerted efforts
to influence the latter.
The Soviets had reasons apart from obvious strategic
considerations for putting greater stress on Soviet-Turkish
relations in the early 1970's. First, the military junta
which ruled Greece from 1967 until 1974 was probably believed
less tractable to Soviet influence over its foreign and
domestic policies than the democratic governments in Ankara.
Second, anti-Americanism in Greece lagged behind the rise of
the same phenomenom in Turkey by several years, although at
its peak it exceeded in vehemence the Turkish variety. With
the fall of the junta in Athens in late July 1974, new
opportunities for advancing Soviet interests in Greece may
have seemed imminent, for the new government in Athens with-
drew from NATO's military infrastructure. That action, when
viewed alongside the Turkish reaction to the American arms
embargo, presaged a period in both countries when a pre-
condition for domestic political success was a professed
ant i -.Americanism.
The Soviets, moving cautiously to take advantage of
Greek and Turkish distress with the United States, seemed to
act from two key propositions. First was the perception
that this unusual convergence of anti-American (and anti-
NATO) sentiment in Greece and Turkey presented Moscow a
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singular and perhaps not to be repeated occasion to expand
Soviet ties with, and ultimately influence in the two
countries, at American expense . Second, the Kremlin was
quite aware of the fact that a series of American mis-
judgements, not the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda, had
created this set of circumstances. The lessons of the
American example were evidently discerned by Moscow, for the
Soviets acted as if they understood the perils of becoming
perceived by either party as too closely associated with the
rival across the Aegean. Thus, more than at any prior stage
in the development of post-war Soviet policy towards these
two states, an interactive effect seemed to link Soviet-
Greek relations with Soviet-Turkish relations.
Indications of that interactive effect are discernible
in the following chronological summary of several key
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would have to be obtained
in advance of American
U-2 flights over Turkish
territory for SALT-II , ?
verification purposes.
"These latter two listings are arguably closer to the
category of "results" of Soviet policy endeavors than they
are to the category of official bilateral "events." They
have been delineated above to depict their curiously
similar timing; both announcements were made almost exactly
one year after important state visits to Moscow by the
Foreign Minister, in the case of Greece, and the Prime
Minister in the case of Turkey.
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Soviet-Greek Events Soviet-Turkish Events
September 1979:
Greek government announces
it will repair Soviet
Naval auxiliary vessels at
Greek shipyards . 1-
The timing of the high level Greek and Turkish visits
to Moscow in 1978 and the subsequent series of warship visits
seemed indicative of a Soviet program designed to balance,
whenever possible, efforts vis-a-vis Greece with those with
regard to Turkey.
Of course, achieving such a balance may not always have
seemed possible, or perhaps even necessary from the Soviet
perspective as long as a general perception of Soviet-
Turkish and Soviet-Greek proportionality was maintained.
Moscow seemed to consider Soviet prospects for success more
promising in Turkey, which fortuitously was the more
strategically significant of the two countries. As a result,
the visit by Soviet Chief of Staff Marshal Ogarkov to Ankara
in April 1978 had no analogue in the Soviet-Greek milieu,
and neither was Athens the recipient of Soviet offers of
military assistance as had been Ankara following the
Ogarkov visit.
Both Greece and Turkey found themselves objects of a
concerted Soviet campaign to increase trade with Moscow during
the late 1970 ' s. Invariably each trip to the USSR by a
high-ranking Greek or Turkish official resulted, among
10"

other things, in either a new trade agreement or a pledge
to discuss increased economic cooperation. Soviet economic
policy towards Turkey was distinguished from that towards
Greece by encompassing a far wider program of large,
inexpensive loans and major industrial projects.
Significantly, both countries at the end of the decade found
themselves more dependent on Soviet and or Warsaw Pact
imports of crude oil, natural gas, and electricity than they
had been in 1970.
Soviet initiatives to encourage energy accords were no
doubt inspired by more than economic motivations. By adding
substance through such transactions to an artfully conveyed
image of growing Soviet maturity and respectability, Moscow
was setting itself off as a counterweight and possible future
alternative to Washington. Further, the growth in Greek and
Turkish imports of Soviet bloc fuels and electricity could
not help but widen Moscow's options for dealing with Athens
and Ankara during future East-West crises.
C. CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS
The foregoing analysis suggests that although there have
been divergencies in the Soviets' approaches towards both
countries, there have been some clear-cut similarities as
well.
In the main, the dimensions in common between these two
approaches, as regulated by Moscow, came to include the
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following features: (a) diplomatic efforts to improve
state-to-state relations and to build up an image of Soviet
credibility; (b) a watchfulness for Greek and Turkish
dissatisfaction over relations with the United States which
might be turned to Moscow's advantage; and (c) encouragement
of widened Greek and Turkish trade, economic, and energy
linkages with Warsaw Pact nations. In the late 1970's,
Soviet policies vis-a-vis Athens and Ankara seemed further
conditioned by a desire to convey a net impression of
proportionality although, as had been the case throughout
the previous two decades, a more concerted and obvious
effort was made to advance the Kremlin's interests in Turkey.
Soviet anxiety to avoid repeating the mistakes of the
seemingly disjointed mid-decade policies of the United States
may be one possible explanation for that apparent dual-
track approach.
As the 1980 's get underway the Greek and Turkish
domestic political landscape of the early 1970 's has been
greatly transformed with somewhat paradoxical implications
for the net effectiveness and quality of long-range Soviet
foreign policy.
In Athens, where the Soviets had been seemingly content
to carry out somewhat pro forma efforts to improve their
image and influence (at least when compared to their efforts
vis-a-vis Turkey), an anti-American Socialist, Andreas
Papandreou, has become Prime Minister. Papandreou appears
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determined to gradually ease Greece out of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization - if not the North Atlantic
Treaty itself - and to seriously restrict U.S. operations at
four major facilities. ° If Papandreou were to accomplish
such objectives without suffering domestic political defeat,
Soviet interests would be demonstrably and decisively
advanced. In the short term, the Soviets without doubt are
pleased with the general anti-American/anti-NATO
predilections of the Papandreou government, and by gestures
such as the recent Greek restoration of a lapsed agreement
to repair Soviet naval auxiliary vessels in Greek shipyards.
[Ref. 86: pp. 76]
In Ankara, on the other hand, the accession to power of
a military regime has put the Soviets in an uneasy position.
For Moscow had been at not inconsiderable diplomatic,
economic, and propagandistic pains from 1953 onward to widen
its influence in Turkey. Having come rather close to success
in 1978 and 1979 with the Ecevit government, the Soviets
currently appear to be suffering withdrawal symptoms.
Although the military has been in power for almost two years,
Soviet criticism of the strongly anti-leftist and pro-NATO
regime has been remarkably muted, and stands in graphic
contrast with Moscow's self-righteous posturing against the
Greek junta in the early 1970's.
^These include: The Souda Bay naval anchorage and fleet
support facilities; the air station at Iraklion, Crete; the




Given the great weight the Kremlin has historically
attached to improving its image and indeed to increasing
its authority to whatever extent possible in Ankara, a
pronounced long-range shift in favor of Athens seems
unlikely. The Soviets will accept with pleasure any
advances that result from the volatile political tides at
work in Greece, partially because their investments have been
relatively slight. But the Soviets have expended far too
many tangible and intangible resources in Turkey to permit




In the interpretation of the NATO strategists "detente"
signifies the immutability of the political postures and
spheres of influence of the imperialist powers ; for them
it spells out the immutability of the basic postulates
of the "Atlantic" policy of strength and building up
military capability. The specious theory that "the
stronger the NATO bloc, the more dependable detente
becomes" is now being dished up. Boris Ponomarev,
(Alternate member of the Political Bureau, Secretary of
Central Committee, CPSU) August, 1980. [Ref. 87]
A. SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND THE WEST EUROPEAN CHALLENGE
Since the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union
has viewed Western Europe as a security challenge to Moscow's
political control over Eastern Europe. The challenge, as
the Kremlin appears to perceive it, resides in the political
and societal features that differentiate the quality of life
in Western Europe from that in Eastern Europe.
The economic and political characteristics that
distinguish the West from the Socialist East flow in the
main from the greater wealth and resiliency of the free-
market orientation of the West, and from the undeniable
commitment on the part of almost all the Western governments
to sustaining relatively open, tolerant, and politically
competitive democracies. The people of the Eastern
n
Notable Western exceptions include: Salazar's
Portugal, Spain under Franco, Greece under the junta (1967
1974) , and perhaps Turkey when under military rule (1960-




socialist camp have been aware for some time of the economic
and political contrasts between their societies and the
West. And on numerous occasions (e.g., East Germany, 1953;
Hungary and Poland, 1956; Czechoslovakia, 1968; Poland
1980-1982 ) popular movements that hoped to effect
political reforms along Western lines have sprung up in
Warsaw Pact countries. Thus Western Europe probably acts
as an alternative model of organizing political, social, and
economic affairs - an appealing lodestone in the minds of
many Eastern Europeans. Correspondingly, Western Europe's
way of life threatens the perceived legitimacy of the
Communist Party-controlled governments comprising the Warsaw
Pact, and hence indirectly challenges those governments'
rather brittle ties to Moscow.
The military dimension of the West European security
challenge, as Moscow sees it, stems from NATO and from the
leading role played by the United States in alliance matters.
The presence of American forces in Western Europe has
probably served as the ultimate check on overt Soviet
military action, though many observers now consider the
credibility of the American nuclear guarantee to have been
weakened. Further, it is this military factor that
protects the West Europeans' privilege to pursue democracy
^An analysis of changing West European views of
European security matters with an illuminating discussion
of the strategic context is David S. Yost, "European Security
and the SALT Process." The Washington Papers , IX, 85
(Beverly Hills and London"! Sage Publications) 1981.
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and capitalism - the very practices which could in the long
run weaken Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe.
Soviet concern to weaken the foundation of the West
European challenge has been simultaneously complemented by
an expansionist ideology and exaggerated by the lingering
trauma caused by the last World War. Soviet foreign policy
towards the countries of Western Europe has been therefore
governed by these and other factors - including, one
assumes, a dispassionate appraisal of each West European
nation's strategic usefulness.
In appraising Moscow's foreign policy in all its many
aspects towards the West European countries stretching
from Norway to Turkey, a common (admittedly long term)
Soviet objective is strongly suggested by the implications
of this analysis. Simply put, it is to secure the
disengagement of the American presence from Europe, to
cause the dissolution of the Western Alliance, and to
preside over and supervise a new pan-European security
arrangement
.
Achieving that would be no trivial process and indeed
may never be achieved at all. Nevertheless, documented
Soviet policies towards West European countries would tend
to confirm the existence of such aspirations; at the least,
such goals are strongly implied by the character of Moscow's
policies and by many authoritative Soviet commentaries,
some of which have been cited in preceding chapters.
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B. GREECE AND TURKEY IN THE CONTEXT OF SOVIET WEST
EUROPEAN POLICY
It is against that backdrop that Soviet post-war
policies towards Greece and Turkey have been analyzed in
this thesis.
Greece and Turkey may have been unique cases for the
Soviet Union, for their rivalry is not matched elsewhere in
Western Europe, and is particularly absent from NATO's
Scandinavian Northern Flank. Moscow has thus felt
periodically constrained to pursue somewhat balanced
approaches towards both countries, lest either Greece or
Turkey start viewing Moscow as too friendly towards the other
party. Further, the substantial strategic value of the two
countries may have exerted more influence on the formation
of Soviet approaches than have their economic and societal
contribution to the West European challenge.
The hypothesis of this thesis has been that success for
Soviet foreign policy towards Greece and Turkey would mean
reduced links between those states and NATO and the United
States. Therefore, key Soviet post-war diplomatic,
political, propagandistic , and economic overtures towards
both countries were analyzed to determine if compelling and
convincing indicators of such a Soviet program could be
delineated.
In the case of Greece, demonstrated Soviet behavior
has been more reactive than assertive, and on balance, the
11.

hypothesis has not been demonstrated to as complete a degree
as this observer had thought it would be. This is not to
say that the Soviets do not harbor the long term aim of
promoting Greek withdrawal from NATO, or that they have not
been delightfully surprised by the dramatic rise to power of
Papandreou. Yet for most of the post-war era Moscow was
apparently content to take a largely indirect and low key
approach towards Greece.
Once Joseph Stalin's policies were put to rest, the
contours of the Kremlin's unobtrusive approach towards
Greece gradually became visible, and came to include the
following features: (a) diplomatic efforts to continue
improvements in Greek-Soviet state relations, and to
encourage Greek perceptions of growing Soviet reliability
and respect; (b) encouragement of Greek-Soviet trade
agreements, with emphasis on increasing sales of critical
fuels and electricity to Greece; (c) a readiness to exploit
to the Soviet advantage issues arising from strains in
Greek-American relations; and (d) misrepresentation of
various features of the Cyprus issue as a means of culti-
vating Greek antipathy for NATO.
Prior to the elevation of Andreas Papandreou to the
premiership, the Soviets had had somewhat limited success
in enhancing their influence in Greece. Since his
victory, however, Moscow's prospects in Greece have
improved. Papandreou appears likely to withdraw Greece from
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NATO (on the French model, perhaps) and to drastically
limit U.S. military operations at four key bases. It is
ironic that the Soviet Union has witnessed such a turn-
about in its apparent fortunes in Greece, while experiencing
setbacks in its relationship with Turkey, where Moscow had
exerted a demonstrably greater effort to increase its
influence
.
In contract with the situation in Greece, the findings
of the analysis tend to support the hypothesis in the case
of Soviet foreign policy towards Turkey. That policy on
balance has been initiatory and assertive throughout the
post-war era.
Turkey, like Greece, has experienced a moderation in
Soviet pressures following the Stalin era. Unlike Greece,
ant i -.American sentiment had been significantly aroused as
early as 1965, and Soviet policies were consequently
adjusted. A series of high level visits between Ankara and
Moscow registered the apparent depth of dissatisfaction on
the Turks' part with the United States, although until the
very late 1970's Turkish willingness to conform to Soviet
policy predilections was rare. During the mid 1960 's the
essential outline of modern Soviet approaches to Turkey came
to be distinguished by the following features: (a) energetic
diplomatic and political efforts to improve Soviet-Turkish
state relations and to cultivate an image of credibility,
"good-neighborliness" and respectability; (b) a readiness to
117

offer financial assistance and trade considerations on
the most favorable terms; and (c) a wary alertness for
signs of tension in Turkey's relations with the United
States, or with the West, which might be turned to Soviet
advantage
.
In the late 1970 's the Soviets seemed to achieve
success in imposing some of their concerns, wishes, and
anxieties onto the framework of Turkish national security
desiderata. Evidence of that success has been discussed
at some length in chapter three and will not be repeated
here
.
Paradoxically, the Soviets may now be paying the price
for having prodded Turkey too abruptly by their use of an
indirect and clandestine strategy that many knowledgeable
Turks now associate with the recent endemic political
violence. Ankara's military leaders apparently share that
view, which tends to reinforce their strong anti-Soviet
instincts
The apparent clandestine feature of Soviet policy
towards Turkey during the late 1970 's was not a part of
Soviet approaches towards Greece at the time. Nevertheless,
in so far as one can infer from the scheduling of high level
diplomatic visits, from the announcements of trade
agreements, and from the timing of warship visits, the
Kremlin seemed to be making an obvious effort to convey an
impression of proportionality in its conduct of relations
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with Athens and Ankara during the late 1970 's. That effort
apparently sprang from Moscow's awareness that Washington's
misjudgements vis-a-vis Greek and Turkish sensitivities
during the 1974 Cyprus crisis had impaired American
credibility and influence in Athens and Ankara. The Kremlin
had no intention of adhering to the American precedent,
although Soviet miscalculations of Turkish vulnerabilities
to an internal political collapse may have paved the way for
the September 1980 military takeover in Ankara.
The interactive effect between Soviet policy towards
Greece and Turkey appears to be waning now, as discussed in
chapter four. The Turks have signally diminished their
willingness to be identified with Moscow be lessening various
diplomatic and economic exchanges. Correspondingly, the
Soviet Union has recently (although circumspectly) begun to
criticize certain aspects of military rule in Ankara.
Past approaches and assumed Soviet awareness of Turkey's
considerable strategic value would suggest that this may be
but a tactical revision in the conduct of long-range Soviet
foreign policy. Moscow has probably expended far too much
diplomatic and economic capital to permit any but the most
grudging of policy disengagements from Turkey.
U.S. policy makers should realize that further American
blunders in the course of U.S. -Turkish relations could well
prompt even a military regime in Ankara to edge towards
Moscow. One has only to cite the examples afforded by the
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Turkish reactions to the 1964 Johnson letter and to the
American arms embargo imposed between 1975 and 1978, to
apprehend the catalytic effect those actions had on the
foreign policy elite in Turkey.
More unsettling inferences can be drawn regarding
Greece, where strong anti-American sentiments - the product
of U.S. support for the "colonels'" regime - were exploited
by Papandreou during his victorious election campaign, and
thus can be cited as having advanced Soviet interests in
Greece. Moscow played an essentially reactive role in the
aggrandizement of Soviet objectives in Greece prior to
Papandreou' s victory, seemingly preferring to avail itself
of periodic fissures in the Greek-American relationship.
American policy makers should be cognizant that with
Papandreou in office the Soviet Union would be only too
glad to associate itself more closely with a leader whose
foreign policy aims appear in numerous ways compatible with
its own. The following TASS commentary of October 19, 1981
smugly reveals the thinly disguised hopes Moscow entertains
for Greece, and the comcomitant perils for the West:
The attention of political observers all over Europe
is drawn to the foreign policy plans of the future
government of Papandreou. On the eve of the elections
the leaders of PASOK declared for the revision of the
conditions of Greece's participation in NATO that have
so far been determined by the so-called "Rogers plan,"
for Greece's leaving the military organization of the
North Atlantic bloc, for the removal of U.S. nuclear
weapons from the Greek territory and the
establishment of Greece's control over the U.S. military
bases situated on Greek soil and their gradual dismantling
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Andreas Papandreou in his statements supported the idea
of creating a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans that
is important for consolidating Greece's security.
As the Greek press notes, the implementation of these
plans would largely promote the consolidation of
Greece's national sovereignty, would lead to the
country's exclusion from a possible nuclear conflict
and would create the conditions for further easing
international tensions in the region. [Ref. 88: pp. 6]
Perhaps little can be done for Greece, from the
American perspective, other than adroitly attempting to hold
the line in pursuit of U.S. interests in such a manner that
Papandreou' s domestic political support does not become unduly
strengthened by fears of American interference. At a
minimum, the United States must seek to discourage Greece's
withdrawal from NATO , and try to postpone, diminish, and
reverse Greek restraints on U.S. military operations at
key bases.
The U.S. should also improve its ability to carry out
long-term policies, based on an understanding of the
permanent aims of Soviet foreign policy in Western Europe.
Soviet successes in both Turkey and Greece have been
facilitated by U.S. blunders in a series of ad hoc decisions
lacking long-term vision. The Soviet long-term vision of
Western Europe's future - subjugation to Soviet influence,
if not conquest - is demonstrable in the pattern of Soviet




THE SOVIET-TURKISH DECLARATION ON
GOOD NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS
The Soviet-Turkish declaration on good-neighborly
relations declared that the two countries would be guided in
their bilateral and international relations by the following
principles
:
1. Development of relations between the two countries
in line with the traditions of peace, friendship and good-
neighborly relations which were laid down by Vladimir Lenin
and Kemal Atatlirk.
2. Respect for the sovereignty and equality of States.
3. Respect for the territorial integrity and invio-
lability of State frontiers.
4. Non- interference in the internal affairs of States.
5. Respect for the inalienable right of every country to*
choose and develop its own political, social, economic and
cultural systems
.
6. The non-use of force or the threat of force and refusal
to allow their territories to be used for staging aggression
and subversive actions against other States.
7. Respect for commitments stemming from treaties and
other sources of international law.
8. Settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.




THE POLITICAL DOCUMENT ON THE PRINCIPLES
OF GOOD NEIGHBORLY AND FRIENDLY CO-OPERATION
BETWEEN THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
AND THE TURKISH REPUBLIC
"THE Udjoc of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics and the Turkish Re public.
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and sport with the aun of strengthening
the sccDo»poere o( tnuiual respect and
trust between the peoples of too Soviet
Union and the Turkish nation;
And to develop between them scicntihc
and technical oo-operarjon and, with
these aims to view, to study the possi-
bility of conducting joint research in tne
fields of industry, agriculture, energy,
transport and public aeaith, 00 which
agreement will be rescued Detween the
rwo countries.
The provisions and principles of (his
Political Document, wnjcn does not pur-
sue any smsl otner than to contribute
to the cause of peace, security and
mutuaily-benebcial co-operation and is
not directed against any state, comprise
a single whole and do not alfect the
nghts or obugauooe of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics and the Tur-
kish Republic under any ag
Ta attach unponaace to the integrity
and equivalence of the principles of -be
FaasiAct;
Ta press oaosistearjy for a further
ieepeoang of the process of detente in
IsasssassasafJ relations and for extending
d sa Btl parts of th* world by developing
the poirucai, military, economic and
swmssrtanan upsets of thxs process;
Ta snswssrt, and to strive o make a
posacrv* onolnbotion to. all efforts aimed
at seaseviag general and complete dis-
ssWasssafJ ondcr ttnet and en^ectrve uv
isrnaaonal conrrol. taking into considera-
tsoa the fact that the race ia the inheres
of Bocttar and conventional arms is not
ocry *hreatening peace and me process
ef deornte but is also leading to negative
aafaWsgsaWsfi 1 both u. hs economic field
east from the point of view of secunry
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